Why Have Officers?

By Col (Ret) Larry Chandler

Why have an officer AFSC if the officers are not expected to know what maintenance is planned or done? Why have officers if they don’t recognize poor work when they see it being done? In Lt Gen Perry Smith’s book, Taking Charge, two of the top 20 to-do list includes: (7) Leaders must not condone incompetence...and are responsible for ensuring the mission is accomplished, (10) Leaders must subordinate their ambitions and egos to the goals of the unit. In an MMS, The CC, Maintenance Supervisor and the flight commander should not be passive; they should have their foot-prints all over the squadron, ensuring the mission is accomplished.  When I read one of the Minot reports, one statement jumped off the page and stuck in my throat. Paraphrased the statement was: the failures were primarily Non-Commissioned Officers and Senior Non-Commissioned Officers not doing their jobs. The information on the squadron maintenance plans & schedule were not “given” to the Squadron Commander and Maintenance Supervisor (I refuse to use the term MOO)? In an MMS there is a commander, maintenance supervisor, a MASO and flight commanders, these officers should not wait to be “given” information---they should KNOW (& approve or change) what is going on and who is doing what and whether maintenance is being done right! It is their job to know! If no one in the squadron is using the squadron maintenance plan/schedule and the first time anyone knows is when a MAJCOM investigation reveals the fact, then that is called a poor command climate & culture---set from the top. Real officers don’t throw the NCOs under the bus when the train comes off the track; we have officers for a reason and they should lead.

I appreciate how important NCOs are to any unit and since my date of rank as an AMMO Master Sergeant was 1 June 1976, can speak with some authority on this issue of officer-enlisted working relationships. I was the NCOIC of Munitions Inspection Section at George AFB CA, We were “Best MMS in TAC”, (1976) and my squadron commander was Major Monte Crook. Major Crook was an F-4 pilot but he BECAME a munitions officer through great effort. He had been a customer and “used” a lot of bombs, bullets and missiles---he made it his business to know the munitions business. He had tremendous credibility with all of us because he did not wait for anyone to tell him anything—and he always made the effort to know the details (Not 9 lines on a PowerPoint slide). Bottom line: officers need to know their business and not just “fail” if their NCOs don’t GIVE them the right information! If an officer does not know his/her business how will they be able to appreciate great maintenance or recognize poor maintenance---until it is too late?

Prior to the Minot incident, there was a push toward developing a “Utility Infielder” support officer concept--a general purpose officer. The baseball analogy would be--second basemen are easy to find and if you are building a team, you can get by with hiring all second basemen to play all infielder positions. This option is cheaper and simpler but it is doubtful this team will win the World Series against teams with left handed first basemen.

Officers need to know their business and understand the details of their mission. For example, BGen Jimmy Doolittle who led the bombing mission on Tokyo after the U.S. was attacked at Pearl Harbor, WWII. Gen Doolittle was an expert pilot but also was an Aeronautical Engineer and held a doctorate in aeronautics from MIT. Why was then “Lt Col” Doolittle able to do the impossible when the country desperately needed someone to lead this extremely dangerous and important mission? He was not a “generalist,” he was an “expert” and a leader---he selected the aircraft, the B-25 bomber, designed and managed the aircraft fuel system modification to maximize fuel capacity, he selected and trained the aircrews; and he led the mission flying the lead aircraft off the deck of the carrier. He completely understood, better than any of those he led, all the facets of the mission—he made the decision to launch a full day earlier because a Japanese fishing boat spotted the carrier and he had to assume the Japanese would be alerted to the attack. He was able to make the launch decision because he knew all the details (the aircraft, the crews and the mission). It would be impossible to have all Gen Doolittle-caliber 21M officers & commanders (a team of all quarterbacks would not work anyway) but the principle is sound--- the officer in charge should know all there is to know about the organization they lead---an obvious goal. Officer AFSCs, the 21M matters greatly explosive safety and nuclear surety are responsibilities that can win or lose on a National Security level. OK, now I will get off my soap box. lchandler@avesllc.com