Are we fixing the right stuff? The MMS!

By Col (ret) Larry Chandler

OK, we have reorganized the entire Air Force again, now we have a new Air Staff directorate (A-10), a new major command, AF Global Strike Command (AFGSC) and the AF Nuclear Weapons Center (AFNWC), significant changes to be sure but if I remember correctly it was a couple of SSgts, a TSgt or two and a couple of SNCO’s who made most of the mistakes at Minot, August 2007? A quote in the Command Directed Report of Investigation (CDI 2007) was revealing, “The catalyst for the failures began in the scheduling process. It further broke down because the supervisors, predominantly the non-commissioned officers and the senior non-commissioned officers did not do their jobs” (p.38). The mistakes were made from the squadron commander level down to the one striper airman level. There is no doubt the officer leadership at Minot was relieved and or disciplined but it seems all of the focus has been on corrective action at the strategic level --- not the inner workings of the Munitions Maintenance Squadron (MMS). There have been several more wing and group commanders relieved of command since the Minot incident because we continue to have problems in moving, storage, handling and maintaining nuclear weapons; the NSI failures and decertification’s just keep coming, why? The answer seems simple but certainly not obvious. Emphasis is required at the squadron commander, the operations officers and the remainder of the SNCOs, NCOs and airmen. As most old retired Munitions Officers will tell you failing NSIs is called “Experience.” Instead of firing those who have failed we need to re-train, counsel, recertify and encourage. We should be selecting and assigning the best 21M officers we can find as MMS squadron commanders (regardless of their “AFPC availability”) and they will have significant impact on unit performance and on educating their senior officers. We as an Air Force have over the last 15-20 years insisted that all an officer needs to be is a “good leader”, we don’t need officers who are experts? Officers are smart enough to understand that when your boss tells you to “get out from behind the fence (WSA) as soon as you can” if you want to get promoted, they do it. That might be great and savvy advice for an individual officer but it does great harm to our Air Force as an institution. This seems obvious, if “everyone” follows that career advice there will be “no-one” behind the fence (WSA) --- this can’t be what the CSAF has in mind?

The “nail in our coffin” was the 1991 merger of the aircraft maintenance officer AFSC (4024) and the munitions officer AFSC (4054). I personally made the mistake of supporting the merger because I too thought it would be good for promotion-I was thinking about my career. However, after being assigned as the HQ AF ILMW munitions division chief, I (1998) saw the unintended consequences, and realized the AFSC (4024/4054) merger was a huge mistake. There were many more aircraft maintenance officers than munitions officers, the DCMs (Colonels) were mostly aircraft maintenance officers [nothing wrong with that] and we all wanted to be in the “dominant tribe” of aircraft maintenance. The aircraft and munitions maintenance officer career fields were already merged at the field grade level but everyone including those crafty AFPC guys still knew who was aircraft maintenance and who was munitions maintenance because they could just look back at their assignment history which started out as either 4024 or 4054-and you can bet they assigned the field grade officers accordingly. When the AFSCs were merged completely it took about 20 years [one career length] to get all of the officers’ with an early assignment history of munitions experience purged. Officers were then assigned intentionally without regard for functional differences. In fact is has become almost a religious fervor to prevent the development of any “stove-piped” (read expertly knowledgeable and experienced) officers. The literature is filled with highly regarded research that no company can survive with the generalist management or the all-purpose MBA’s mentioned by Gabarro’s 1987 (Harvard Business School) 12 year longitudinal study. We just can’t get a break; the commercial world discovers the MBA generalist manager is a myth four years earlier than we adopt the MBA generalist officer model in maintenance? I hope it is never too late to say we are sorry and reverse course, we do need some experts if the generalist are going to have anyone to manage. lchandler@avesllc.com

My Thoughts on How to Mitigate the 21M Squadron Command Experience Gap



By Lt Col (ret) Brian Withrow

Here is my thought on how to mitigate the Air Force’s Munitions Officer “experience gap” of qualified candidates for nuclear munitions squadron command.  While there is no substitute for at least 10+ years of actual experience in nuclear munitions jobs, the AF could implement a rigorous one year WSA emersion program for a select number of thoroughly vetted 21M majors and senior captains with squadron command leadership potential.  As 21Ms, these folks should already have held at least one job in a MSA/WSA during their career.  Double billet these command candidates into WSAs with the sole, thoroughly scripted purpose of “deep emersion” into every facet of nuclear weapons management.  The key concept being “on-site” exposure, not some group academic classroom environment.  Expose to every duty section, place emphasis on the study of all relevant directives (AFI, T.O., JNWPS, etc…), and have them observe as many nuclear weapons operations as possible.  Send them TDY to observe NSI/DNSI team processes and send them to a couple mentoring encounters with retired munitions officers that were nuclear squadron commanders in the ‘80s & ‘90s.  If at the end of the one year emersion there isn’t a Munitions Squadron command billet available, then get them into a Maintenance Supervisor billet within a WSA or assign them to a NSI/DNSI team position until a command job comes open.

Unfortunately, I can’t claim this approach as some unique flash of brilliance on my part.  Similar methods have been successfully employed in the past.  One only needs to do a little research to reveal “skills gap” solutions from the corporate world on the internet.  This of coarse is only a “stop gap” measure.  The AF needs to acknowledge and fix how we got into this mess in the first place.  The AF needs to shift the personnel management focus from “career” development to experience development to meet supervision, command, and staff job skill requirements.  Over the past twenty years, mission support functional career field mergers and a flawed emphasis on career broadening resulted in many Field Grade Officers that know a little about a lot and have in-depth knowledge of very little.  21M Company Grade Officers require consecutive assignments in “core” munitions jobs to achieve the level of knowledge needed to have a reasonable expectation of mission effectiveness in 21M FGO billets.  And nuclear weapons experience is an even more focused specialization of 21M job knowledge.  The idea of the well-rounded (broadened), highly successful, plug them in to any job, general leader/manager is the rare exception, not the norm.  Yet this myth has persisted in the AF over the past 20 years.  Experience matters… don’t think so?  Then why not have your next brain surgery performed by a Family Practice Physician. Or closer to home, why aren’t some flying squadrons commanded by great maintenance leaders?  Hum, seems the “just need to be a good leader” philosophy only applies to mission support organizations. bnwithrow@hotmail.com

We have done so much, why are units still failing NSIs?

By Col (Ret) Larry Chandler

The AF has stood up Global Strike Command, commanded by a three star general; created an Air Staff Directorate (A-10) dedicated solely to nuclear weapons issues; stood up the AF Nuclear Weapons Center in Albuquerque and placed the management of all nuclear weapons storage areas (WSA) under the center’s management. Each of the three organizations (GSC, HQ AF/A-10 & AFNWC) has been manned by staffs (100s) and yet we continue to fail NSIs, why? The answer is simple; we have not addressed the core problem. At Minot in 2007 all of the errors, except the radar navigator not checking each missile safe-status, were errors in tasks that normally fall under munitions officers’ management. The bottom line is that the critical problems at Minot [and probably at other locations as well] were at the squadron level… and we are busy fixing the headquarters level problems?

After the ACC Command Directed Investigation (CDI), the CSAF Blue Ribbon Review (BRR), the Defense Science Board (DSB), the Schlesinger phase I & II and the USAF nuclear weapons roadmap (Reinvigorating the Nuclear Enterprise), there has still been no examination of the impact of the 1991 elimination the munitions officer AFSC (and the weapons safety officer positions). There are probably real problems at the headquarters levels and some of the reorganizations have been effective, the right thing to do - but the unintended consequences of eliminating the munitions officer AFSC in 1991 have been significant and yet remain to be discussed? When the munitions officer AFSC existed we had a dedicated professional set of officers who spent their entire career managing conventional munitions and nuclear weapons storage areas, weapons handling, weapons loading, armament systems, maintenance, safety, accountability, transportation, logistics and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD). These munitions officers managed the enlisted AFSCs for all of these functions. Supervising these enlisted functions in different major commands over the course of their careers provided munitions officers a common, deep understanding of conventional and nuclear weapons fundamentals [more in common than you might think---all designed to detonate] and provided Air Force senior leaders with good MMS squadron commanders and knowledgeable munitions staff officers at every level. These officers did, from time to time, fail NSIs and some officers’ careers took a hit because of those failures---some have held that is why the “logistics officer” community was so adamant about getting rid of “non-promotable officer AFSCs” (munitions officers). It was just too risky, career-wise to be in charge of the WSA (75% of the NSI pass/fail areas)---so if we spread out the risk and you only have to do it one time, you could get lucky and not be there when the failed NSI occurs---you might even be eventually promoted to general officer rank (few officers in the 1970s & 80s saw this as a realistic scenario---but look at us now---many more senior “logistics” officers now)?  Some people believe this to be at the core of our current organizational culture problems.

The munitions officers (prior to 1991) were not being “career broadened” to prepare them for some “to-be-determined” senior leadership position, they were providing the Air Force with safe, secure and reliable management of mission essential conventional munitions and nuclear weapons. These officers were interested in promotion, of course, but they did not have unrealistic expectations and there was very little careerism (not because they were saints but because it was just not realistic). We need to stop wringing our hands about whether we have created an attractive nuclear weapons career path for our best and brightest officers and do the right thing for the Air Force as an institution-“Needs of the service, remember?”. We should assign officers to munitions officer jobs because we desperately need full time professional management of this critical mission function (At the squadron level instead of at the HQ equipped with the famous 2,000 mile screwdriver). The Munitions Maintenance Squadron commander jobs should be filled with the best functionally experienced and qualified officer leadership, regardless of their availability (?), tour length, overseas return date, preparation for more senior leadership positions, attractive career paths and all the other fog factors which seem to be in vogue. Remember what Gen Curtis LeMay said, “We don’t have time to sort out the unlucky from the incompetent.” A new computer program is not the answer; all of the MAJCOM LGWs use to manage their munitions officers with notes on a yellow legal pad and the telephone on their desk – they actually KNEW them. We currently have the fewest WSAs and munitions officer positions since 1952 and someone thinks the answer is for AFPC to assign officers based on an SEI (OK, the DTs will do that; or do the DTs take care of fast-burners, schools and developmental assignments--we are preparing for those TBD more senior leadership positions)?

Prior to 1990, we had many WSAs, CONUS and OCONUS and many more munitions officers to manage and yet the MAJCOM LGWs knew all their munitions officers (major & above), working assignments that made sense for the wings, the numbered AFs, major commands, Air Force and then, when possible, for the individual officer’s career. The MAJCOM staffs, the Air Staff and the Joint Staffs were selectively manned, not just another computer generated assignment. Why? The reason was “for the good of the Air Force” and not the good of the individual officer. There were still problems and there were occasionally just poor-performing officers that got through the screening but for the most part, officers assigned to these staffs were the resident experts in munitions. The sharpest [combination of technical competence & leadership ability] munitions officers were assigned as MMS commanders and staff officers at every level; munitions officers were not usually groomed to be DCMs because those positions were normally aircraft maintenance officers (which made sense, “for the good of the maintenance complex). There were and always will be munitions officers with that more than normal leadership drive and there have been two munitions officers who rose to three star rank and became the HQ AF A4/7) However, the munitions officers’ value was their functional munitions experience and expertise in nuclear weapons and conventional munitions from the squadron to the joint staff---they were the ESSENTIAL stove-piped officers.

Somewhere we allowed someone to sell the USAF a bogus load of crap that all logistics officers should be generalist officers and that stove-piped munitions officers were less promotable, less valuable to the AF, none of which is true as has been painfully borne out by the Minot and Taiwan incidents. It seems incredible that the munitions officer career field merger with the aircraft maintenance officer career field did not surface during any of the post Minot/Taiwan incident high level investigations/studies? I wonder why? The BRR included a brief mention of the difference between 21Ms assigned to bomber units versus21Ms assigned to ICBM units but there was no mention of the potential impact of the career field merger diluting the munitions officer expertise as evidenced in the Minot incident? Are we going to have the leadership fortitude to “back up” and do the right thing for the Air Force instead of what is best for individual logistics officer’s careers? The jury is still out.

Oh, I almost forgot to answer the question, “Why are we are still failing NSIs?” Because we have not addressed the munitions & missile maintenance officer career field and the Air Force requirement for stove-piped, deeply expert officers. We need to assign the most experienced and deeply qualified munitions officers as munitions maintenance squadron commanders (we have the fewest WSAs since 1952 – so it is a small number) and we should stop trying to use the 3,000 mile headquarters screwdriver to control a squadron’s performance. The answer to why we are still failing NSIs is that we have not focused on the major/lieutenant colonel squadron commander. If we do, he/she will fix the squadrons. We continue to focus on the general officer but that is not the problem or the solution. lchandler@avesllc.com

Excerpt from ADM Rickover speech to Columbia University School of Engineering November 5, 1981

“The man in charge must concern himself with details. If he does not consider them important, neither will his subordinates. Yet "the devil is in the details." It is hard and monotonous to pay attention to seemingly minor matters. In my work I probably spend about 99 percent of my time on what others may call petty details. Most managers would rather focus on lofty policy matters. But when the details are ignored, the project fails. No infusion of policy or lofty ideals can then correct the situation.

There is concern today over the apparent decline in U.S. productivity. In searching for its causes we should not overlook the impact of the many professional administrators who run large corporations. Though trained in management at our leading universities, they [officers-in-charge, HQ staff division chiefs, officers, MMS/CCs, etc.] are often unskilled in the technical aspects of the company. As a result they manage largely in the terms they learned at school. Technical, operational, and production issues are quickly reduced to issues of numbers and dollars, upon which these administrators apply their management techniques.

Admiral Donald Report quotes - you will not see these published in normal channels

By Col (Ret) Larry Chandler

Admiral Donald identified a systemic lack of technical competence, “Individuals in leadership positions lacked the technical and professional experience necessary to effectively analyze problems and develop solutions” (p. 7).

Donald identified that, “there are some leaders with little, no, or dated nuclear [weapons] experience who hold leadership positions in the Air Force nuclear enterprise, including supervisors and enlisted members as well as squadron, group and wing commanders” (p. 47).

“Less than half of the 22 senior commanders had the required technical backgrounds for the positions they held (Donald, 2008). Admiral Donald observed “a lack of wing, group and squadron leadership on the floor of the WSAs [weapons storage areas] where build-up and disassembly of reentry systems occurs” (p. 47).

[How often does the boss show up where the work is done? No 10 speeches will equal one sincere visit and thoughtful interchange of ideas and discussion]

Important quotes you are not likely to see in Air Force literature

By Col (Ret) Larry Chandler

We need a few MMS commanders and staff officer division chiefs like those key employees described by Leonard & Swap in their HBR article.

Excerpt from Deep Smarts by Leonard & Swap

“When a person sizes up a complex situation and comes to a rapid decision that proves to be not just good but brilliant, you think, “That was smart.” After you’ve watched him do this a few times, you realize you’re in the presence of something special. It’s not raw brainpower, though that helps. It’s not emotional intelligence, either, though that, too, is often involved. It’s deep smarts, the stuff that produces that mysterious quality, good judgment. Those who have deep smarts can see the whole picture and yet zoom in on a specific problem others haven’t been able to diagnose. Almost intuitively, they can make the right decision, at the right level, with the right people” (Leonard & Swap, 2003, p. 2).

“Throughout your organization, there are people with deep smarts. Their judgment and knowledge—both explicit and tacit—are stored in their heads and hands. Their knowledge is essential. The organization cannot progress without it. You will be a more effective manager if you understand what deep smarts are, how they are cultivated, and how they can be transferred from one person to another” (Leonard & Swap, 2003, p. 2).

Excerpt from Cambridge Handbook of Experts & Expertise

Bill Gates, “Take away our best 20 people and Microsoft would become an unimportant company” (Becker, 2002, p. 8 quoted in the Cambridge Handbook of Experts & Expertise, 2006, p. 14).

I wonder if this applies to taking away the most expert (stove-piped) munitions officers from the AF munitions career field and leaving in place a cadre of “broadly qualified logistics officers who are well prepared for some future more senior logistics officer positions,” would this be similar to Bill Gates comment?

Commanders and Their QA

By Lt Col Earl Bennett

A few years ago shortly after I took command of a munitions squadron, I received my first brief from my Quality Assurance chief who proceeded to tell me how well things were going in our unit as evidenced by our nearly 100% pass rate on QA evals and inspections.  I had already been in command for about a month when this occurred, and I had already been doing some “spot checks” of my own as I walked around the various shops and around the Munitions Storage Area.  I listened to my QA chief tell me how well our maintenance troops performed on their evaluations and then I said something like this: “well, that’s amazing we have such a high pass rate.  As the Chief and I have walked around the squadron, I’ve noticed we have some pretty poor housekeeping practices.  I’ve also noticed we don’t do a good job keeping equipment forms up to date.  So, you must not be looking at these things in your QA Plan?” 

After an uncomfortable silence, my QA team admitted that perhaps they could tailor their program to focus on these areas.  The Chief, I, and my QA sat down and we decided we could do more inspections in these areas as well as tighten up our overall program.  We also agreed that a 99% QA pass rate might not be the best indicator of the quality of our maintenance if we weren’t looking at everything or looking at things critically enough.  We agreed to revamp the QA Plan, and revisit on our next meeting.

Interestingly enough, QA found some of the same things the Chief and I had found in our walk-around.  They wrote them up, and briefed the chain of command.  It was amazing how fast the word spread throughout the squadron, and everyone tightened up their adherence to standards.  We still had failures, and we learned from them; both the technicians and leadership.

The story doesn’t end here; our objective is a continual journey to meet the exacting standards required in the munitions arena while supporting the mission.  The cost of failing to hold that standard is just too high, and we must never grow comfortable in reading the latest statistics from our QA or some other source to tell us all is well.  Leaders, at all levels need to know their business just as well as their technicians and their QA.  Nothing commands the respect of your people as much as a maintenance leader knowing and comprehending the intricate details of the munitions business.  A word of advice, this knowledge doesn’t come from sitting at your desk and answering emails; munitions officers need to be out with their people perfecting our trade.  That’s called leadership.

A Look Back… Maintenance Flight Commander

By Capt Josh Trebon

One purpose of this blog is to share experiences of the trade with fellow 21Ms. That being said, what does a 21M really need to know to be successful? I have heard repeatedly that good officership is all that is needed to accomplish any task, just focus on your profession as a military leader and you will be successful. However, I think that is painfully misleading. So what does a 21M need to know to successfully accomplish the mission? There is no blanket answer because even though munitions is often mistakenly looked at as a narrow “stove-piped” career field, it’s really huge (almost 400 pages of TTP – XX) and diverse. However, what I can offer for this discussion is my personal experience as a Weapons Maintenance Flight Commander at a MUNSS in USAFE.

The following is a description of a typical day, and the tools of the trade I employed to ensure my flight’s commitment and performance. Hopefully some of what I learned may be helpful to other 21Ms tasked with similar jobs.

The key to my success at the MUNSS was building trust amongst those who worked for me.  I tried to do this through very simple gestures. For instance, show up early before the troops each morning and be the last to leave, be confident, and establish buy-in by listening and sharing your decision logic. However, remember the flight is not a democracy, take advice, but the decisions, responsibility and any repercussions are all yours.  You always defer the praise to those who work for you and claim for yourself the things that went wrong. That is what being in charge means to me.  It has become somewhat of a cliché, but I really do believe we have to manage by walking about. Know your troops professionally and personally, always go to bat for your troops when warranted, but if people screw up, hold them accountable, enforce integrity and accountability, and uphold compliance. Our behavior as leaders is where a compliance culture comes from… behavior, not just words.

I found that everyday there was an opportunity to ensure technical orders, work orders, instructions, etc. were followed to the letter! I made it clear that it did not matter if my flight could do their jobs in their sleep, we must always enforce using the regulating document to carry out tasks. For example, when I had my accountability section process Weapons Status Reports (WSR), I enforced the use of TP 100-3150 throughout the process, to include line-by-line Quality Control (QC). The extra 10 minutes of review, saved us multiple hours of correction and MFRs to fix any errors. This is how organizational high reliability cultures are established… by what the boss “will allow.”

Day-to-day workings of the shop should follow right along with the compliance culture concept. I would start every day off with a stop in Munitions Control. Review the schedule (set at the weekly scheduling meeting with all section chiefs), review the work orders for the day and week, review manning and know the location of all flight personnel (comes in handy for contingencies and impromptu exercises), review work orders with Munitions Control, Accountability Section and Weapons Maintenance Section (ensures all are on the same page). Once this is done, meet with the Maintenance Operations Officer (MOO) to brief what the flight has going on that day. It was important to ask the MOO to occasionally sit in on the scheduling meeting from time-to-time as well. However, bottom-line is to always keep the MOO informed on what is going on… the same goes for the Squadron Commander. Once I felt like I had my house in order for the day, then I would get some administrative work out of the way. After that, as I eluded to earlier, “un-ass” the desk and get out and about again. Stop in all sections and see what’s going on, check on all the items reviewed on the work orders and flight schedule from earlier that morning. If sections needed anything to finish tasks or if work is behind schedule then it was time to “do something,” to get them back on schedule. 

In order to ensure my troops had the tools they needed to accomplish the mission, I was always interested to see what training was going on. I wanted to ensure pertinent information was flowing to Munitions Control or any other section that needs to know how to do the really important stuff (e.g., emergency procedures, safety, line number/fire symbol updates, etc.). Above all follow up, I trust but verify. Don’t just sit around and assume that because the training is on schedule that it is being accomplished and/or being done right. Remember “we” are fostering a compliance culture by where we go and what we do all day, not by what we “say.”  At the end of the day I would take an “officer-in-charge” review of my flight’s work orders---have they all come back? No one working on a maintenance team should go home until the work order is completed back into Munitions Control and all tools are checked back into the tool room. My section NCOICs knew I was paying attention, they were paying attention as well and we had a great team, but in my opinion this starts with a knowledgeable and active Flight Commander. As Company Grade Officers we really do make a difference in mission accomplishment.

There were a wide-range of tools and knowledge I had to learn. There were many technical orders, instructions, etc. that directly impacted the flight’s day-to-day operations. How could I ensure a compliance culture unless I understood what the troops had to do?  I always tried to have a copy of these documents at hand; AFI 21-204 & 101, AFI 91-101,104 & 112, and AFMAN 91-201.  I also sought to learn and understand how each section in the flight interrelated (one team one fight). For a MUNSS this was a complex relationship, because security forces, communications, command post, services, and the command section had to function as a single team. To know what all the other sections had going on I listened intently at the SQ/CC’s weekly scheduling meeting so I could try to harmonize my operations with theirs.

Understand the relationship with your Host Nation (HN). This is maybe one of the most important aspects of a MUNSS. Since most dealings with the HN fall to Weapons Maintenance and Security Forces (SF), it was up to me and the SF Commander to foster a good working relationship.  When I was in the Flight Commander seat I would do lunch with the HN representatives, attend their scheduling meetings, and in particular, stop by HN Wing Ops, the Chief of Maintenance Office, and the Fire Chiefs Office frequently throughout the week, sometimes only to chat. It is a good idea to foster a good HN working relationship. Ensure the HN has buy-in early in your decision making process, especially scheduling. Leaving the HN in the dark and demanding assistance will lead to mission failure and definitely an “UNSAT” and a “re-inspect” at NSI time.

Last of all, I tried to learn everything I could about Weapons Safety… this has to be known “down pat”. Keep the Weapons Safety Office in the loop at all times, remember they assist greatly in ensuring your compliance culture.

I hope this rambling about my experience at a MUNSS proves helpful. The main take-aways are that we must know what the troops do, know what guidance rules our work, always “live” and enforce a compliance culture, hold the troops and ourselves accountable, and establish and nurture the key working relationships needed to ensure successful mission accomplishment. All these tips may seem “no-brainers”, however, recent events indicate that we need to reacquaint ourselves with the fundamentals. If you agree or disagree with me, let me know, submit a counter or complementary post or contact me directly. josh_trebon@hotmail.com

What Does a Munitions Maintenance Squadron Commander Really Do?



By Col (Ret) Larry Chandler and Lt Col (Ret) Brian Withrow

What does a Munitions Maintenance Squadron commander really do? Think back and remember what made your best squadron commander the best? What did that commander do that was so special? We “old-timers” talked about this topic and what follows is a discussion of our collective experiences.

First, we can’t start this discussion about the MMS commander until after we have talked about the top of the old maintenance food-chain. The Deputy Commander for Maintenance (DCM) was “God”. The DCM knew all there was to know about maintenance and if you could survive morning standup (for which we were all seated) then it was going to be a good day. Surviving meant one of two things, either you had not been called on to answer a question or miraculously you were called on but had a good answer (a right versus wrong answer). In our days, as opposed to today, “I don’t know” was not a good answer. As BGen Atkinson wrote in a recent Exceptional Release (EA) article, if your boss asks you what is the population of Australia and it is not your job to know the answer, then “I don’t know” is OK. But if your boss asks you what the munitions loads are for tomorrow’s flyers… it is NOT ok to say “I don’t know.” It is your job to know---and to know all the preparation and planning have been done right.

Now of course even “back then” many DCMs did not know all there was to know about maintenance. Many were pilots who were out of flying duties for whatever reason and were colonels, so they had to be somewhere and maintenance was available? But we don’t sell these colonels short because remember these colonels had been “consumers” of maintenance and even though they might not have been knowledgeable about how maintenance was done, they did recognize when the product was good and when it was bad. These colonels learned fast and always had a seasoned deputy who had done most of the jobs in maintenance or worked “in the business so long they were extremely knowledgeable. So the colonel (DCM) and his deputy were really managing the entire maintenance complex and this was their profession. What did we talk about? Was it Air Power, was it officership, was it how to get promoted to general officer… nope, it was maintenance, just maintenance.

Most of us would have been excited at the thought of being promoted to lieutenant colonel and getting to command a MMS. This is a long-long time ago in the “bad old days” when becoming a squadron commander was not the first step in the process to become a general officer… it was a dream come true and the pot of gold at the rainbows end! Few officers achieved such distinction and honor. Nobody I ever talked to was trying to hurry and finish their squadron commander job, they were practicing their argument with the DCM to let them command a larger squadron or get an assignment to command OCONUS. If you were really up for the big time, there was an extremely “outside” chance to command a MUNSS in USAFE or one of the three Aviation Depot Squadrons (you were a knowledgeable insider if you just knew what these AVDSs were), or the 400^th MMS.

So, what did MMS commanders do? They certainly knew their business and if they didn’t they did not last long. Now to be fair, this was the good old days when MMS/CCs had orderly rooms and staff, so the commander’s focus was the mission. They knew who was doing what in the squadron and they knew their strong and weak officers and assigned them accordingly. In the munitions business when things go wrong you really have a bad day. Remember that all our “stuff” is actually designed to blow up and kill people. So if you don’t follow the rules you might kill your own people and in the midst of combat operations, you might stop the entire wing or even the entire AF from accomplishing the mission. Yes, it is a very big deal to be a munitions officer. The joke use to be even the DCM might not know your name, but if munitions blow up in the storage area or on the flightline or don’t fall off the airplane as designed, or fall off the airplane when they are not supposed to, everyone will know your name, especially if you are the MMS commander.

Usually the MMS commander had been the OIC of the storage area (MSA or WSA or both), he had been a services/weapons loading/armament officer, been the OIC missiles and always had an explosives/weapons safety job (if he could not get out of it). Of course when the MMS/CC was a lieutenant he had been a MASO or had grown up with the supply officer who was one, it was the bottom of the food chain. I know this is different today. We think of the MASO as the youngest officer in the squadron but we also think the MASO is the most highly skilled and trained officer that nobody in the squadron knows what they do or how they do it (you know DIAMONDS---ooh aah, is such complicated software/hardware?). There was a time when we all had to the be the MASO as a rite of passage and every officer up our MMS chain of command had already done that job done this operation before, I was confident they would perform well without the need of my direct supervision.”

This is the condensed version of the mishap story, but suffice it to say that when I, Maintenance Supervision, QA, and Armament Flight leadership convened to reflect on the lessons learned from the investigation, we all agreed that the record of success that had been achieved with much effort had a down side; overconfidence and complacency were creeping in.  In our business the need to stay vigilant never ends. The Group and Wing Commander’s confidence was understandably shaken. The young airman required multiple surgeries and did recover, but I shutter to think that he could have been killed. Moral of the story…don’t let your guard down even when all appears excellent, expect the unexpected from unexpected places, and as a wise President Reagan put it… always “trust but verify.” lchandler@avesllc.com

Why Have Officers?

By Col (Ret) Larry Chandler

Why have an officer AFSC if the officers are not expected to know what maintenance is planned or done? Why have officers if they don’t recognize poor work when they see it being done? In Lt Gen Perry Smith’s book, Taking Charge, two of the top 20 to-do list includes: (7) Leaders must not condone incompetence...and are responsible for ensuring the mission is accomplished, (10) Leaders must subordinate their ambitions and egos to the goals of the unit. In an MMS, The CC, Maintenance Supervisor and the flight commander should not be passive; they should have their foot-prints all over the squadron, ensuring the mission is accomplished.  When I read one of the Minot reports, one statement jumped off the page and stuck in my throat. Paraphrased the statement was: the failures were primarily Non-Commissioned Officers and Senior Non-Commissioned Officers not doing their jobs. The information on the squadron maintenance plans & schedule were not “given” to the Squadron Commander and Maintenance Supervisor (I refuse to use the term MOO)? In an MMS there is a commander, maintenance supervisor, a MASO and flight commanders, these officers should not wait to be “given” information---they should KNOW (& approve or change) what is going on and who is doing what and whether maintenance is being done right! It is their job to know! If no one in the squadron is using the squadron maintenance plan/schedule and the first time anyone knows is when a MAJCOM investigation reveals the fact, then that is called a poor command climate & culture---set from the top. Real officers don’t throw the NCOs under the bus when the train comes off the track; we have officers for a reason and they should lead.

I appreciate how important NCOs are to any unit and since my date of rank as an AMMO Master Sergeant was 1 June 1976, can speak with some authority on this issue of officer-enlisted working relationships. I was the NCOIC of Munitions Inspection Section at George AFB CA, We were “Best MMS in TAC”, (1976) and my squadron commander was Major Monte Crook. Major Crook was an F-4 pilot but he BECAME a munitions officer through great effort. He had been a customer and “used” a lot of bombs, bullets and missiles---he made it his business to know the munitions business. He had tremendous credibility with all of us because he did not wait for anyone to tell him anything—and he always made the effort to know the details (Not 9 lines on a PowerPoint slide). Bottom line: officers need to know their business and not just “fail” if their NCOs don’t GIVE them the right information! If an officer does not know his/her business how will they be able to appreciate great maintenance or recognize poor maintenance---until it is too late?

Prior to the Minot incident, there was a push toward developing a “Utility Infielder” support officer concept--a general purpose officer. The baseball analogy would be--second basemen are easy to find and if you are building a team, you can get by with hiring all second basemen to play all infielder positions. This option is cheaper and simpler but it is doubtful this team will win the World Series against teams with left handed first basemen.

Officers need to know their business and understand the details of their mission. For example, BGen Jimmy Doolittle who led the bombing mission on Tokyo after the U.S. was attacked at Pearl Harbor, WWII. Gen Doolittle was an expert pilot but also was an Aeronautical Engineer and held a doctorate in aeronautics from MIT. Why was then “Lt Col” Doolittle able to do the impossible when the country desperately needed someone to lead this extremely dangerous and important mission? He was not a “generalist,” he was an “expert” and a leader---he selected the aircraft, the B-25 bomber, designed and managed the aircraft fuel system modification to maximize fuel capacity, he selected and trained the aircrews; and he led the mission flying the lead aircraft off the deck of the carrier. He completely understood, better than any of those he led, all the facets of the mission—he made the decision to launch a full day earlier because a Japanese fishing boat spotted the carrier and he had to assume the Japanese would be alerted to the attack. He was able to make the launch decision because he knew all the details (the aircraft, the crews and the mission). It would be impossible to have all Gen Doolittle-caliber 21M officers & commanders (a team of all quarterbacks would not work anyway) but the principle is sound--- the officer in charge should know all there is to know about the organization they lead---an obvious goal. Officer AFSCs, the 21M matters greatly explosive safety and nuclear surety are responsibilities that can win or lose on a National Security level. OK, now I will get off my soap box. lchandler@avesllc.com

Unintended Consequences of Senior Leadership Decisions – A Visionary Proven Right

By Col (Ret) Larry Chandler

Major General (Ret) Lewis Curtis, SA-ALC/CC (1987) owned the Aviation Depot Squadrons AVDS). The chain of command was AFLC/CC to SA-ALC/CC to SA-ALC/DSW to the three AVDS squadron Commanders---pretty direct chain of command. The AVDS squadron commanders  (Lt Col) wrote a monthly letter on the status of the squadrons direct to AFLC/CC and info to SA-ALC   (This was inspired by the “ADM Rickover Letter” that Sub Commanders had to write each month—the AF adopted the practice).  The following text resulted from the AF wide discussions on merging the munitions officer career field into the aircraft maintenance officer career field – a single consolidated career field in 1987. MG Curtis saw this merger as a bad idea… the story follows.

MG Curtis wrote a letter to BG Philip Metzler, HQ AF Director of maintenance and supply (LEY), 21 April 1987. MG Curtis argued that merging munitions and aircraft maintenance officers would produce only superficially qualified officers. He called the merger “dangerous.” --- Quote, “We have learned through long and bitter experience that nuclear logistics operations demand experience and technical expertise far beyond that required for general maintenance of even non-nuclear munitions (Curtis, 1987). MG Curtis wrote this memo in 1987 and 20 years later in 2007 we have the Minot and Taiwan incidents which were both obviously, “Nuclear logistics operations,” and were the management responsibility of 21M officers. The results of senior leadership decisions are often not evident until 15-20 years after the decision (Jacques’s Stratified Systems Theory [SST], 1986).

MG Lew Curtis was insightful to see 20 years into the future and be right! Even I thought the merger was a good thing in 1987---But I was drinking the “cool-aid” and trying to run with the herd to get promoted too. It is probably a good thing to remember, we want the AF/mission and America to be a win… and not just our individual careers to be successful.  Bottom line, MG Lew Curtis was absolutely right, the munitions officer career field (nuclear and conventional) are too technical and the risk of failure too great for a “generalist” maintenance officer model!  lchandler@avesllc.com

Culture of Conscientiousness

by Lt Col (Ret) Pat Thayer



In our business things are designed to “Blow Up” so we have to really know our business---the goal is to blow up the enemy and not ourselves! Back in “my day” there was a single overriding concept that guided all of our day to day activities in AMMO, both conventional and nuclear.  From the first day of training in munitions school we were taught to know the rules of AFM 127-100 (now AFI 91-201) and follow them diligently – no deviation allowed without proper authority.  We lived by this precept and deviated at our great professional peril because our bosses also knew the rules and demanded nothing less than full compliance.

It seems to some we were always out of sight and out of mind---i.e. the bomb dump is always 10 mile off-base for a reason; the flightline is where you get promoted? But when we go to war as we are now, live ordnance (conventional and nuclear) must be handled correctly or the mission will fail and good people will get killed. Sure, sometimes we screwed up or let political expediency (by officers who did not understand the requirement for “expert” management of the munitions function) overrule our better judgment -- the results were sometimes catastrophic, e.g. Bien Hoa (Blew up a base in Vietnam because of a loading error with an M121A1 anti-withdrawal fuze) and more recently the Minot and Taiwan incidents. We have to, as officers, KNOW OUR BUSINESS!  By and large we lived this “culture of expert conscientiousness”, which seems to have been lost in the modern era of generalists “the utility-infielder officer” who can play any position.  I fear that unless and until we recapture this idea of overriding officer experts with clear management responsibility more bad things will happen.

General Ron Fogelman – A Story of Leadership

By Col (Ret) Larry Chandler

While assigned to the 4404th Logistics Group at PSAB, Saudi, General Fogelman, then the CSAF visited and had the occasion to tour our transportation squadron’s vehicle maintenance facility (Tent). It was hot and our mechanics were working hard everyday trying to keep the oldest fleet of hand-me-down vehicles in-commission. The mechanics were sweaty, and their overalls were what you would expect of folks taking engines and transmissions apart and all these mechanics were deeply involved in the vehicle repairs. When General Fogelman walked through the facility he had an entourage and was getting a walking briefing from the transportation squadron commander, Lt Col Rita Woolwine. When Gen Fogelman stopped the procession at a Hummer (in the midst of major engine work), he engaged the young mechanic in a discussion of engine overhauls. Gen Fogelman was overhauling his car engine at Bolling AFB -- and he engaged in a very detailed discussion of problems and solutions. Very shortly there was a circle of the 70 mechanics around Gen Fogelman and the conversation had already lasted well over 30 minutes when the Colonel travelling with the CSAF, tried to get him to disengage and move on to the next stop on the wing tour. Gen Fogelman resisted lightly and the colonel decided to be a little more assertive because they were falling too far from the scheduled itinerary…until Gen Fogelman abruptly stopped talking, turned to the colonel and said, “Colonel you can see I am busy and when it is time to go, I will let you know”---stared, and then Gen Fogelman returned to the SSgt he was talking to. Every dirty and tired mechanic was engaged with the CSAF that day in the vehicle maintenance facility -- beamed with pride and you never saw such a vehicle in-commission rate ever. Gen Fogelman was not talking to these mechanics about the role of Air Power, or the importance of fighter squadrons to the Joint Task Force, or the need for mechanics to be “focused on compliance,” he was talking with them about vehicle maintenance. He was focused on what “they” were doing and not on what he was doing. He did not need to say how important vehicle maintenance was to the overall AF mission -- in words, because by spending his time and engaged attention, he had already done that in spades---that was real leadership. There were many of us who learned a valuable lesson that day!

This was the CSAF but the lesson in this story is not about a visit from the CSAF, the lesson is for those in leadership positions - you only have to genuinely engage your people on their jobs to have a tremendous impact on performance. It can’t be a fake performance but if you are genuinely interested in what they are doing and pay them the compliment of doing your homework and learning enough of the details to be able to engage them about the work, the entire AF team wins.

A quote from a recently published book about General Curtis Lemay supports this basic principle. Kozak (2009) described LeMay’s move out of Europe at the end of June 1944, when General Hap Arnold assigned him to run the B-29 operations in India. LeMay was told there were “problems” with the airplane. Lemay knew every part of the B-17 but had never even flown a B-29. Kozak wrote, “Lemay immersed himself in the planes’ technology. But rather than asking the ground [maintenance] crews incessant questions, he simply worked alongside them and seemed to just absorb what they knew” (p. 170-171).

The principle is pretty clear and has been modeled for us throughout our short Air Force history; effective leaders get firsthand knowledge of the problems to be solved and do not rely on 9 lines from a staff officer to understand complex issues. Real leaders are self-driven to understand the details and that is why they seem to always be able to “connect the dots” and make good decisions. lchandler@avesllc.com

A Capable Munitions Squadron Commander

By Col (Ret) Larry Chandler & Lt Col (Ret) Brian Withrow

The organizational nucleus for mission accomplishment in the Air Force is the squadron, and the squadron commander is the leader appointed to ensure that missions success.  In his book, Commanding an Air Force Squadron, Col Timothy Timmons describes commanding a squadron this way, “[it] is the only time in your career when you are simultaneously close to the mission and in command.”  It is a position wherein deep functional job experience has theoretically transpired and the immediate application of command and leadership is expected upon appointment.  The number of munitions squadron command positions and the competition process for selection of squadron commanders is such that relatively few attain the position.  Consequently, there must be a higher-level confidence by senior leadership that those selected for this critical interface between the mission and the personnel charged with its accomplishment are capable.  But what does it mean to be capable?

Upon assuming command, everything about and impacting the squadron will become the commander’s responsibility.  In addition to the “primary” mission the enormity of all the Air Force’s administrative and personnel management programs will weigh heavy on the commander.  No other position approaches this level of responsibility in scope.  This is why personnel being considered for command should have comprehensive knowledge of the business of the squadron assigned; this is not the time for functional mission OJT.  Actual experience should be a significant prerequisite for command.

A capable Munitions Squadron Commander will serve many formative years prior to assuming such a role.  But, the depth of munitions technical competence developed during the preceding assignments will have as much impact on the degree of mission success as the quality of leadership and management skills attained.  Good leaders with comprehensive technical experience in the munitions career field will intuitively grasp the importance of actions affecting mission accomplishment.  One of the most critical responsibilities of command is ensuring that the squadron accomplishes its mission in the most effective and safe manner possible. But to be empowered to lead and having the technical knowledge to put that empowerment into action are two different things.  Perhaps the hardest challenge is to recognize ineffective and unsafe behavior and act to change that behavior when not knowing definitively what “right” is. Plus, how credible and effective is a commander going to be at assessing and mentoring young munitions officers into future Munitions Squadron Commanders if they have not performed and mastered the subordinate level jobs themselves.

Munitions Squadron Commanders need to resist the constant pressures to focus attention on administrative suspenses and rather redirect that attention to what “Johnny and Sally” and their NCOs are doing in the maintenance and storage areas.  Administrative responsibilities cannot be ignored, but the programmatic burden of squadron administration needs to fall on the subordinates whose job it is to work the details for commander review and decision making.  To drive mission success, commanders must get out to all their sections, branches regularly to observe, interact, and ask questions.  Commanders must be forward leaning… seen at all time to be actively engaged regarding the squadron’s “primary” mission.  lchandler@avesllc.com

The “Stovepipe” Myth

By Lt Col (Ret) Brian Withrow



My recent retirement from the Air Force (AF) presented an opportunity to reflect upon my years of service as a Munitions Officer.  I’m one of the last of the “old breed” Munitions Officers to depart the AF having entered the career field in the next to last class of AFSC 4054 students at Lowry AFB in March 1989.  It’s not just the timing and circumstances of my entry into the munitions “profession” that I feel make me one of the “old breed”, but that with the exception of one stint in F-16 sortie generation, all my duty  assignments/experiences were directly related to munitions.  That, unfortunately, is what makes me a rarity as I depart the AF.

As I mentioned, I was in one of the last “Munitions Officer” career field training classes at Lowry, which is because sometime in the late 1980’s a movement to transform logistics career fields emerged within AF senior leadership. The impetus for this transformation was a belief by some that there was a need to develop a greater depth of understanding within logistics core competencies such as aircraft maintenance and munitions.  That it was necessary to break down “stovepipe” career fields to develop officers who understand the “full scope” of logistics competencies whether at home-station or deployed. This was done with the belief that logistics career field mergers and logistics “broadening” would improve efficiency and effectiveness in the Joint operations environment while simultaneously cutting costs and eliminating wasteful redundancies.

The fallacy of this “career broadening” strategy was the premise that some logistics career fields such as munitions were “stovepipes” in the first place.  As defined in the business world, “a stovepipe refers to those parts of an organization that focus on a single objective without regard to parallel efforts in neighboring divisions, enterprise-wide efficiency, cost/benefits, or the relationship between the organization and the overall game plan of the enterprise.”  The targeting of this term toward “specialized” functional competencies within the logistics’ community such as munitions invoked perceptions that just weren’t true.  Opinion that the munitions career field was a limited and narrowly focused set of competencies grew and led to a belief by many that serving in consecutive munitions jobs made you less promotable.  In reality, none of these misconceptions had a basis in fact but became convenient mainstream thought in the face of growing political pressure to downsize and reduce budgets.  As a result, the depth of munitions expertise amongst officers in the logistics community diminished throughout the 1990’s to present contributing to disturbing “high profile” mishaps and inspection failures, most notably in the nuclear weapons functional area.

Functional competencies in the munitions career field are not limited and narrowly focused.  Even though I spent most of my years in munitions jobs by choice, and by today’s AF benchmark would be considered to be “deeply” experienced in munitions, there is still so much more I could have experienced and learned.  One could spend a lifetime of work “broadening” just in the variety of munitions related subjects it is possible to encounter.  Just consider the wide variety of conventional and nuclear weapons and associated components in the munitions stockpile even after extensive force drawdowns; it still covers the gamut from small arms ammunition to strategic missiles.  Consider all the weapons delivery airframes and systems, release systems, and weapons loading; storage/handling, inspection, maintenance.  Think about the associated special facilities, equipment and tools, vehicles and trailers.  Take into account weapons safety, munitions accountability, and even what was looked upon as the “special ops” of the munitions officer career field when I entered the service, Explosives Ordnance Disposal (EOD).  Plus consider all the organizational levels where munitions knowledge is needed; flight, maintenance supervision (sorry, I don’t call it Ops Officer), squadron command; staff officer positions at HQ AF, MAJCOMs, Joint Staff, OSD, and Combatant Commands.  Don’t forget System Program Office (SPO) positions and munitions acquisition and procurement jobs; plus consider test program positions at Eglin and Nellis, and AFMC Depots positions and prepositioning programs such as Standard Air Munitions Package (STAMP) and the Afloat Preposition Fleet (APF).

The AF needs to revitalize the Munitions Officer career field and acknowledge that “deep knowledge” of munitions functions is necessary for its mission success.  During my time on Air Staff when contingency operations such as Desert Fox or Kosovo occurred, I never recall senior leadership requesting a “logistics officer” when they needed munitions information in the Crisis Action Center.

Thoughts on the 2007 Minot Incident

By Capt Josh Trebon

Can someone remind me about how Minot happened?  Not the creation of the base, but the over flight of U.S. soil with nuclear weapons in August 2007.  Of course I’m being facetious, but how can we still be totally overlooking the underlying cause of such as serious event, and continue to put band-aids on things that were never at the heart of the matter?  I have been a MASO and at Minot accountability was not the issue.

The issue at hand is we failed to develop 21M (and before that, munitions officer) nuclear expertise, and that failure helped bleed off the compliance culture which was founded on specialized technical expertise.  Since I came in the Air Force in 2003, I have had the officer career broadening “cool-aid” forced down my throat… but I don’t buy it.

I have so far been able to avoid this, thank goodness.  How can one ever think generalization is a good thing?  Is it better to be 100 yards wide and 1 inch deep or 1 inch wide and 100 yards deep?  The truth I feel is somewhere in the middle, but this concept is definitely at the very heart of what I think went wrong at Minot in August 2007.

Most of the troops at Minot were trying to do a good job, but we as officers are supposed to be ensuring the right things get done the right way. We do this by being there in the WSA, being a part of the convoy to the flightline, being there to watch the loading, be there to verify selected weapons against workorders, 1911s, and 1348s, and above all be there to ask the right questions at the right time. This is how a compliance culture gets established and maintained. I am a Captain, but I know enough to focus all my attention on my current job which is a 21M and not on the all important “career broadening.”  I have heard too many times that officers don’t need to know the details that is why we have NCOs…how do you know you have good NCOs…if you don’t know enough about what your NCOs are doing to make that call?

This is all tied to leadership.  If your boss hasn’t done your job before you, and has no clue of the daily tasks at hand for those he leads, there is unlikely to be any mentoring going on, and as result a very small chance for a strong compliance culture.  In that case, the unit better be extremely lucky.  It is strong, specialized leadership with deep nuclear weapons expertise, responsible for accomplishing the mission… with an involved desire to foster a compliance culture that is the answer to the woes of our Air Force “nuclear enterprise.”  Josh.trebon@hotmail.com

Why A Munitions Insider (MI) Blog?

By Col (Ret) Larry Chandler

The idea for this blog was a logical progression from the email newsletter we began in 2009.  The purpose remains the same, to provide a vehicle for the exchange of professional and career information, technical issues and opinions of AMMO officers at all levels of active duty and those who are retired (term is used very loosely). There will be no membership roll, you can be an interested reader or contribute blog article posts.  Those in the Air Force “munitions business” who have something they want to say can send an email to me with their article for review, and if it is suitable (99% will be suitable since there is no “official” position to defend), it will be added as a blog post

Since some officers are working for bosses who have never done the jobs of those they lead… perhaps some additional mentoring from officers who have done jobs at every level in the AMMO/munitions, nuclear weapons business will be helpful... we can all learn from multiple sources.

Please send articles of any size, no formatting required, for inclusion as an MI blog post to lchandler@avesllc.com.  Articles from past Munitions Insider Newsletters will soon follow as this first posts to this blog.  The MI blog is being hosted and edited by Lt Col (Ret) Brian Withrow, bnwithrow@gmail.com.