Do We Need Leaders or Managers,Generalists or Specialists: a False Question?

By Larry Chandler, PhD, Colonel (Ret) USAF

Leaders or managers, generalists or specialists; the arguments over who should command a munitions squadron, a group, a wing or even for local, state or federal public office usually turn on these issues. However, I claim we have so ill-defined these terms that arguing which is preferable is pointless. It might be more productive to describe what we expect the person “in-charge” of a particular organization to do. I have asked quite a few squadron commanders what they do and I am usually told, “I am the commander.” So there appears to be some confusion between an officer’s job title and the specific duties the officer is expected to accomplish (i.e., who an officer is compared to what the officer does).

It is important to analyze the specific job to determine what tasks the person selected will have to perform and then determine what knowledge, skills and abilities the person will need to perform those tasks successfully. Another way to describe this phenomenon with regard to USAF munitions squadron commanders is to ask the question, “Does the commander really need to understand what the troops are doing in order to ‘lead and manage the squadron or is it sufficient for the squadron commander to be a figurehead-cheerleader without a direct impact on squadron mission accomplishment?”  There have been munitions squadron commanders who were experts and squadron commanders who were generalists. To my knowledge there have been no studies assessing whether one had more organizational success than another. However, the Air Force Senior Leader Management Office did commission RAND to study general officers with and without “complete domain knowledge” (i.e., knowledge of the organization they led). Scott, Drezner, Rue and Reyes (2007) interviewed 27 out of the total of 431 general officers and concluded that general officers with more complete domain knowledge (i.e., knowledge and experience in the organization-mission they led) performed with the following advantages:[i]

• Establishes and maintains credibility
• Serves as a template for understanding how organizations, processes and problems are structured
• Provides an experience base for recognizing when current problems are similar to past problems
• Provides a well-learned set of systematic problem-solving approaches
• Aids in identifying experts who can contribute to problem-solutions
• Results in knowledge of a network of similarly experienced professionals to help solve problems and implement solutions
• Appreciates the second and third order of consequences of alternative courses of action and therefore are able to make critical decisions more reliably, confidently and expeditiously

Admiral Rickover, father of the U.S. nuclear Navy, spoke at Columbia University (5 November, 1981) on this same issue (i.e., leadership, management, generalists and specialists).

            “The man in charge must concern himself with the details. If he does not consider them important, neither will his subordinates. Yet, the devil is in the details. It is hard and monotonous to pay attention to seemingly minor matters…Most managers would rather focus on lofty policy matters. But when the details are ignored, the project fails. No infusion of policy or lofty ideals can then correct the situation.”[ii]

Lt Col Zettler wrote in a 1986 Industrial College of the Armed Forces research paper that the Air Force needed more generalist logistics officers and this paper was quoted in a 2008 article in the Logistics Officer Association (LOA) Exceptional Release as follows: “Officers provide the leadership, the technical skills are provided by the non-commissioned officers…”.[iii]

I don’t think Lt Gen Zettler meant officers don’t need to know any of the technical details of their organizations or operations. I worked for General Zettler and I never worked for any officer who knew more of the technical details of our work than Gen Zettler. However, the constant drumbeat encouraging officers to career broaden into generalist “loggies” over a twenty-year period may have produced a much different kind of officer.  At Minot AFB, Major General Raaberg, team chief of the Air Combat Command investigation of the Minot-Barksdale nuclear weapons-related incident of 2007, described the 5^th Munitions Squadron officer leadership as disengaged from the daily maintenance activities. Raaberg further described the maintenance scheduling operation as a loose confederation of shop chiefs.[iv] Too many senior leaders at all levels  have encouraged subordinates to leave the technical details to others and focus on leadership, and continue to do so. The results may be exactly those Admiral Rickover warned about in his 1981 speech at Columbia University. Admiral Donald, appointed by the Secretary of Defense to investigate the Taiwan nuclear weapons-related incident, found this to be the case. Admiral Donald found that, “Over half of the senior commanders, colonel and above, did not have the requisite technical background and experience to lead the organizations they commanded”.[v] 

So it seems pointless to argue about which abstract terms we use to label the officer in charge (i.e., leader, manager, generalist or specialist), there are too many different definitions, all based on strongly held beliefs but little actual evidence. In the Air Force leadership is the coin of the realm and there is little interest in being a great manager but manager or leader is a false argument. Whether leader or manager, the core issue is what can he or she do if assigned as the officer in charge; whether it is a large organization (i.e., U. S. Air Force) or a small organization like the weapons maintenance branch. Perhaps we should start discussing what specific duties the officers selected to command are required to perform and what knowledge and experience would best prepare officers to lead their organizations to succeed? 

The term officer-in-charge seems pretty clear and we only encounter the generalist moniker above the rank of colonel (i.e., a general is a generalist and everyone from colonel to second lieutenant is not). I agree with Admiral Rickover, if the boss is not concerned with the details then neither will the subordinates and we know the results of that from the Minot-Barksdale and Taiwan nuclear weapons-related incidents. 

To paraphrase one of my favorite lines from the movie “Patton,” I don’t want to get any reports about what jobs an individual officer needs to better prepare him or her for “more senior logistics leadership jobs.” I want to hear reports urging the selection of an officer for command because he or she is the best officer to command the organization. Lt Col Jimmy Doolittle and Colonel Curtis LeMay were not selected to command because they needed to be developed for future “big” jobs, they were selected because their superiors believed they would get results…Doolittle and LeMay were extremely knowledgeable, skilled and passionate…driven to lead their organizations to succeed.

Bottom line at the bottom (i.e., BLAB), if you are in charge of an organization you should know more about that organization and how it accomplishes the mission than anyone else in that organization: Execute, that is why you are the commander.

Post Script: My next article will address the effects of career broadening officers concurrently at each level in the organization…over an extended period of time. If the munitions squadron commander, the operations officer and the company grade officers are on a career broadening assignment; and the MAJCOM headquarters staff division chief/officers and the headquarters Air Staff division chief/staff officers are also on career broadening assignments…is there an impact?

---

[i]  Lynn Scott, Steve Drezner, Rachel Rue, Jesse Reyes, (2007). Compensating for Incomplete Domain Knowledge. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007,

p. 21.

[ii] Admiral Hyman Rickover, “Doing a Job of Work,” Speech to Columbia University, 5 November 1981, Retrieved from:  http://govleaders.org/rickover.htm

[iii] Lieutenant Colonel Michael Zettler, (1986). Air Force logisticians: Generalist or specialist. Washington, DC: National Defense University, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1986, p. 14.

[iv] Air Combat Command, Director of Operations (A3), Major General Daniel Raaberg, CDI Report of Investigation: The Minot AFB ND-Barksdale AFB LA-Unauthorized Transfer of Nuclear Weapons, 2007, p. 36.

[v] Office of the Secretary of Defense, Investigation of the Taiwan Incident, Chairman: Admiral Kirkland Donald,  Report of the Investigation into the Facts and Circumstances Surrounding the Accountability For, and Shipment of, Sensitive Missile Components to Taiwan, Washington DC., 2008, p. 47.

Remember Those Old Career Colonels We Learned From?

By Larry Chandler, PhD, Colonel (Ret) USAF

On Memorial Day weekend I always find myself thinking back over my Air Force career, enlisted and officer, about the leaders who always made our organization win. What makes those memorable leaders stand so far above the average? There is something they have in common. They were all totally confident, took charge, led from the front… they all seemed to intuitively know how all the pieces should fit together.

Even though we had many more people in the Air Force when I enlisted (850,000 versus the 333,000 today), I don’t remember any meetings where 15 general officers met for half a day to discuss what should be done, but I do remember colonels who knew exactly what to do and did it. These colonels had grown up in the munitions and aircraft maintenance business and knew every aspect of their operations, they put the right people in the right places at the right time to get the mission accomplished… even when things went wrong, as they always do, these career colonels made changes on the fly and without missing a single sortie, got the job done every time.

These career colonels were not worried about being promoted to general officer because they loved the jobs they were doing.  These colonels were not on the way to a bigger job, they were in THE job! These career colonels were at wing level, numbered AF level, MAJCOM LGMs and LGWs and they were at the Air Staff and Joint Staffs and defense agencies… and at each level these colonels were growing their replacements.

Career colonels were hard and demanding but most officers under their leadership learned all there was to know about the munitions and aircraft maintenance business… you had to!  That said, nothing is as personally satisfying as being an expert in your chosen profession and there must be nothing worse than feeling like a useless hood ornament because everyone else in the unit knows more about what they are doing than you do.

So, the message on Memorial Day weekend is let us all work to be those career colonels and to teach those we are fortunate enough to serve as supervisors, everything there is to know about our business…especially the AMMO-Munitions business. When our business goes wrong people die and the mission can not be accomplished without the munitions.

Well, Sign Off My AF Form 623

By Larry Chandler, PhD, Colonel (Ret) USAF

When I enlisted in the Air Force my initial rank was Airman Basic, I had no AF Form 623 (On-the-Job Training (OJT) record); it was only after I graduated from the Munitions Maintenance Technical School at Lowry AFB that my supervisor gave me an AF Form 623. After graduating, I was classified as a 3-level (skill) in the Munitions Maintenance Career Field. The first assignment was to Tyndall AFB in Air Defense Command (ADC), and even though I was a conventional AMMO troop, I worked in the missile shop and the nuclear weapons shops doing all the storage, handling and transportation tasks. These tasks were perceived as manual labor and below the station of the much smarter Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC) 463 (now 2W2) Nuclear Weapons Maintenance Technicians and AFSC 316 (now 2W0) Missile Maintenance Technicians. However, it was a big deal as a 3-level to get each storage, safety, inspection, handling and transportation task signed off and initialed by my supervisor. There was a lot to learn and after I had been signed off as having the knowledge and skills required to perform all these tasks unsupervised, I was awarded a 5 skill level. This was a big deal! I could then work unsupervised and even train those unfortunate enough to be only 3-levels. The next sequence of assignments covered a great deal of professional AMMO jobs, Thailand, to Hill AFB (OO-ALC), to RAF Lakenheath and then back to the USA at George AFB. By this time I had been signed off on all the tasks and knowledge requirements and been working as a 7-level for a couple of years.

Then came the big day when I became the NCOIC of a Munitions Inspection Section… a shop chief! I thought this was as good as it could get, but there was still more to learn and more sign-offs to get. Managing a shop just seemed a natural thing to do, and I loved it! The biggest thrills were acing major command inspections and helping others experience the thrill of victory on a personal level like; your guys knocking the socks off the SKT and PFE tests, getting promoted, and winning special top-performer awards during MAJCOM inspections… this was just great duty and we all stayed in touch. The common thread through all these experiences, that I had never known before I joined the Air Force, was the recording of my career field progress in knowledge and skills attainment. In addition to the AF Form 623 technical training entries there was the professional military education and civilian education courses. My first supervisor and all of my subsequent supervisors encouraged me (all of us really) to take every military and civilian education course you could…never say no. That was great advice. Even after having been a munitions inspection shop chief twice, I took the USAFSE which was the first promotion test for SMSgt and scored 93%...wow, was I excited. Then before I could enjoy the spoils of my victory, my Squadron and Wing Commander both decided that I needed to attend Officer Training School (OTS). I had applied and been rejected three times already, so I was not excited at the prospect of adding yet another rejection, but my squadron had just been recognized as the “Best Munitions Maintenance Squadron (MMS) in Tactical Air Command (TAC)” for 1976 and my bosses would not accept my reluctance to try again. Strangely, I was accepted on this fourth application and went off to Officer Training School (OTS), even though I already had a Masters Degree and had scored 93% on the USAFSE?

After graduating from OTS, second in my class behind Dick Hitt who graduated #1, things began to move fast. Dick was also an AMMO troop, a friend and fellow 35^th MMS troop from George AFB (Two AMMO troops grads # 1 & 2…wow!). It seemed aircraft and munitions maintenance was a great career field to have remained in from enlisted to officer and I lived a charmed life of great assignments. After a 335^th Aircraft Maintenance Unit (AMU) at Seymour-Johnson, I went to Explosives Ordnance Disposal (EOD) School and then onto command the 7008 EOD Flight at RAF Lakenheath for three years achieving the first & only “Outstanding” Nuclear Surety Inspection (NSI) rating in the command. Then two years of USAFE NSI inspector duty, inspecting guys doing the same job I had just finished doing myself… I learned a lot in two years. Back to the states as the maintenance supervisor of the 3098 Aviation Depot Squadron for three years…my two previous years as an USAFE NSI inspector were great preparation and we did very well. The next three officer ranks came very quickly. I spent a year-in-a-tent in Saudi as the 4404^th Logistics Group Commander earning the distinction of the Best Large Logistics Group in the AF. I spent the last two years of my service as the HQ USAF Munitions, Missiles & Space Division Chief and had the distinct honor of resurrecting the Munitions Officer AFSC (it had been merged with Aircraft Maintenance in the 90’s) as the 21M Munitions and Missiles Maintenance Officer career field. It was the right thing to do, but I really hosed up by including the big missile maintenance officers; it was not a good move for them or the munitions officer career field. There are times when compromising what you know to be the right thing, just so you can get some of what you think the AF needs is a huge mistake… better to keep arguing for the absolute right thing to do. MY MISTAKE, sorry for that one! The big missile maintenance officers have more in common with aircraft maintenance officers… they maintain the missile platform, not the bombs bullets and warheads.

I retired and left the fight to the younger officers. However, the old AF Form 623 habit of always striving to get another knowledge or skill signed off never left me. Having completed all the correspondence courses, graduated from all the levels of NCO and officer PME, and having completed my B.S. (for AMMO guys we obviously got that one), an MBA/Aviation from Embry-Riddle, pilot certificate with instrument rating, FAA A&P/IA certificates while still on active duty, I was looking for something else for my AF Form 623. Since I was teaching for Embry-Riddle (ERAU) at Andrews AFB, the center director told me that I should get into the PhD program with Northcentral University, an online program, because they had a special joint program that would accept all my ERAU MBA coursework. Ok, another AF Form 623 entry, I signed up and looked forward to signing off another entry. Well that was five years ago…five years is a long time and although there were many times I thought about throwing in the towel… too many stupid requirements, revisions and arbitrary rules of format and citation management. However, finally it is over, now I have completed another AF Form 623 entry… almost all of these entries in the very same career field of aircraft and munitions maintenance and EOD. Now that I have finished, my wife Margaret and I are off on our RV for a nice long trip, but Margaret dreads hearing what she knows she will eventually hear, “well what’s next?”

Undisclosed Airfield Ammunition Supply Point

By 1^st Lt. Kai Reyes

Working munitions on Undisclosed Airfield is a dynamic experience, especially for a Lt on his first deployment.  Knowing Bomb Dumps to be called Munitions Storage Area’s my whole 2.5 year Air Force career I was surprised to find people calling it an ASP (Ammunition Supply Point).  Why?  Because the Army ran it.  Everything Air Force munitions personnel do goes through the Army Chief Warrant Officer (CWO).  The Marines, together with the Air Force are a tenet unit on Army grounds all performing the same job.  There are a lot of strings attached with this relationship, but overall the relationship is strong and the mission is not hampered.

The first and biggest point Air Force Ammo has concerning Undisclosed Airfield munitions is space.  When looking at the space, and seeing 30 pads for storage, an in-bound/out-bound pad, an Air Force bomb build pad, a Marine bomb build pad, a residue pad and a few random lots of sand  where extra munitions are put thanks to signed Risk Assessments, one would think that space would not be a primary issue.  However, with all the new airframes coming in to Undisclosed Airfield no one would not think that American forces will be pulling out by 2014.  Each new airframe steadily increases the demand of munitions that must be placed in the ASP.   Stockpile Surveillance is especially weary of new munitions that are in-bound.  Finding space to put everything physically frequently becomes an issue (busting NEW is rarely an issue since just about every other safety issue is waived by the Wing Commander), causing Air Force munitions supervision to come crawling to the Army to try and get a new pad loaned to us.  Munitions Accountability finds it very hard asking GACP for munitions to meet a pilots’ demand for trigger points when expenditure history on a particular item would indicate that whoever made up the trigger point level must have raided a local stash of opium and mistakenly smoked a whole lot of it.  In the eyes of Air Force munitions inspectors the majority of the pads, in fact the entire bomb dump, can be re-warehoused to more efficiently utilize the space available to all three departments.  In a bid to receive more pads the Air Force asked the Army to re-warehouse all of their pads in order to create more space only to be shot down.  We’ll ask again when the new CWO arrives. 

A Memorandum of Agreement (MoA) exists that delineates which storage pads will be used and/or shared by the Air Force.  This MoA exists between Air Force Ammo flight and the Army munitions unit.  Most Air Force leadership at the Squadron and or Group level know next to nothing about munitions operations and would rather not be involved in these MoA’s unless it came to stopping us from supporting airframes.  However, with the 10^th Mountain Division running things on Undisclosed Airfield not even a Group Commander could get the Army to budge if they did not want to.  Not to mention the munitions that the Army provides to its’ ground pounders and helo units account for a very high percentage of munitions expanded in the whole Southern Afghan theater.  As usual with most MoA’s it does not cover everything, there are still a lot of handshakes that are done every month or so in order for the mission to keep on going.  Both Air Force AMMO and Army AMMO feel that it is best to leave us to our own devices when it comes to making these decisions anyway, and so far everything has come to an agreeable conclusion.

Excellence in All We Do.  When taking a drive through the storage pad rows one can easily tell which department owns which pads.  It is particularly interesting to see pads that are shared.  One half clean, organized and worthy of the MMSAV inspection the Air Force had just gone through in November 2010, and the other half (depending on which weekend warrior crew chiefed the operation) looking like a representation of The Leaning Tower of Pisa added by large amounts of used banding for decoration.  However, there is no jurisdiction for the Air Force in Army territory, also given the fact that these Army personnel are here for a 365 day, one can expect a more relaxed approach to operations in order to sustain the stamina throughout a deployment thereby avoiding burn-out.  Besides what might be wrong in the Air Forces’ AFI does not mean it is wrong in another services manual.  The Marines are also very inspection worthy, save for the few cigarette butts occasionally found behind sand berms.  Regardless of how each pad looked, all three branches always strive to help out their sister services, whether I it be sharing forklifts, GCU testers, and facilities in order to perform maintenance on trailers, the job will always get done.

Security of the ASP is another issue.  The Army considers the ASP a restricted area, however COM Undisclosed Airfield does not have a number assigned to the line badge to represent authorization into the ASP.  This is all very confusing to Air Force leadership, when it comes to showing your line badge in restricted areas.  The answer is the Army allows anyone it wants to in the ASP so long as it is in the entry list at the gatehouse and no one has to wear their line badge.  It took QA a while to figure that out, so they would not attempt to write us up for it, and thankfully the MMSAV team had nothing to say about it since they realize their jurisdiction is limited to the Air Force.  However, do not confuse line badges with no number for the ASP with the willingness of the gate guards to keep their ASP safe.  I won’t get into details, but if you ever plan on running in the bomb dump at night to get some exercise be sure to bring extra reflective gear or else you will be liable to having several locked and loaded M-4’s pointed at you by young Marines and G.I.s who have had a lot of spare time lifting weights and drinking protein mixes.  And don’t think that saying, “I am in the Air Force its’ okay” will get you any further out of the whole.

With the constant evolution that Undisclosed Airfield goes through on a monthly basis it is a beautiful sight to see how munitions/ordinance personnel adapt to what they are given.  With projects underway to increase the quality-of-life and workplace environment of our AMMO brethren this job we will become less insane and more productive while maintaining the safety needed to ensure everyone comes home with ten toes and fingers.  As long as we get supplied with the good water bottles (not that Hyatt crap that smells like Diesel fuel) to make coffee with and to mix with our protein powder AMMO can accomplish anything.  If you aint AMMO…

A Munitions Officer Perspective of Overall Airfield Safety Concerns at One Location within the OEF AOR

By: Capt Joshua J. Trebon         

No space, no coordination, and a big safety mess.  With over 28,000+ ISAF, U.S. military & civilian personnel, and contractors undisclosed Airfield, Afghanistan gets the mission done, and done well, but not without its share of safety issues.  Built out of an old Soviet era airfield and an Afghanistan International Airport, undisclosed Airfield maintains a limited territorial footprint amongst Afghan farming communities, thus lack of space is a driving issue at the Airfield.  The Airfield is comprised of one active runway (10,500’ x 180’), two emergency landing strips, and 32 parking ramps.  A plethora of aircraft are represented throughout the Airfield, comprised of various fighters, cargo, helos, and ISR aircraft—including some unmanned platforms.  Aircraft assigned to the Airfield are owned and operated by 7 NATO nations and 3 U.S. services, which further makes things problematic due to differing safety guidelines.

Space is a major concern of the Airfield.  With 28,000+ personnel, the Airfield is running out of room to put everybody, not to mention the quantity of aircraft, which is expected to add 2 additional squadrons comprised of 24 additional aircraft—further populating the busiest airfield post-Vietnam War.  At least in this instance we were made aware of the incoming aircraft, however, past experience at the Airfield has shown that aircraft would literally just show up without any prior planning.  Thus, the airfield consists of 131 probable explosive safety violations, 17 DDESB site plan exemptions, multiple AFCENT waivers for people/equipment, and multiple risk of aircraft loss acceptances by the Wing Commander.  For instance each parking ramp has on average approximately 52 safety concerns.  Further most the ramps are not even close to K-30 requirements.  Reasons for this massive number of safety issues are due to the following: space limitations with an ever-growing mission, lack of coordination between Airfield users, unclear citing authority, and unclear overarching guidance.

The safety communities at the Airfield are not in close coordination.  As stated before, often aircraft show up with no prior planning.  Thus, safety concerns are not pointed out and mitigated in advance.  Site plans are created for each ramp, however, they are only for that ramp, they fail to look the next ramp over and see what implications that parking area may have on the surrounding ramps.  Further problematic, since nearby ramps may be a different nation’s aircraft parking area, that ramp may have different standards IAW NATO site planning.  NATO tends to use their peace vs. contingency site planning guidance ad hoc IAW what serves them best at the time.  The Base Commander has implemented policy, however, it is very generic and is not directive at all.  Thus safety reps from the different nations tend to be laxed and focus on the “waive vs. fix philosophy.”

Anymore it seems the military has more Chiefs than Indians, however, here it is the opposite.  There is no clear or specific citing authority at the undisclosed Airfield.  The Wing has a Weapons Safety Manager (WSM), however, NATO answers to the base commander, who has set generic safety requirements.  And, oh by the way, those safety requirements are not to AFMAN 91-201 requirements, etc., which are followed by the Wing.  Thus, the Wing strives to have their paperwork and safety plans in order, but they are still in violation because their NATO counterparts’ areas affect theirs.   The current norm is find answers you want and then implement those without researching the effects you may have on nearby areas and other nation’s assets.  I know the mission comes first, and the mission is ever-growing here, but I see a massive safety event coming down the pike if something doesn’t get done about it.

So how can this safety snafu of a base be rectified?  The Wing has begun to take steps to help the situation, but those steps will not fully solve the problem.  Mainly the Wing has pushed to move its assets to one consolidated geographic location of the Airfield to limit NATO site planning issues infringing on our site planning.  However, as space becomes further limited as more airframes and further parking ramps are added to the airfield, the lack of prior coordination still needs to be resolved.  The Base Commander needs to establish directive guidance to resolve differing site planning regulations, and establish one clear citing authority.  Further he needs to appoint a Base WSM to manage the various representative pool of airfield user WSMs, and fully manage the airfield as a whole vs. individual fiefdoms.  In addition, he must make coordination mandatory with WSMs prior to any construction project on the Airfield.  Many people/equip waivers could be resolved if this step was implemented.  Finally, he must look to nearby airfields which could support influx of additional airframes vs. jamming all airframes into an already overtaxed/overworked airfield.  The task will not be easy, but it needs to happen.  If Bien Hoa Air Base, Vietnam, on May 16, 1965 proved us anything, airfield safety cannot be taken lightly, regardless of mission requirements.

Are we fixing the right stuff? The MMS!

By Col (ret) Larry Chandler

OK, we have reorganized the entire Air Force again, now we have a new Air Staff directorate (A-10), a new major command, AF Global Strike Command (AFGSC) and the AF Nuclear Weapons Center (AFNWC), significant changes to be sure but if I remember correctly it was a couple of SSgts, a TSgt or two and a couple of SNCO’s who made most of the mistakes at Minot, August 2007? A quote in the Command Directed Report of Investigation (CDI 2007) was revealing, “The catalyst for the failures began in the scheduling process. It further broke down because the supervisors, predominantly the non-commissioned officers and the senior non-commissioned officers did not do their jobs” (p.38). The mistakes were made from the squadron commander level down to the one striper airman level. There is no doubt the officer leadership at Minot was relieved and or disciplined but it seems all of the focus has been on corrective action at the strategic level --- not the inner workings of the Munitions Maintenance Squadron (MMS). There have been several more wing and group commanders relieved of command since the Minot incident because we continue to have problems in moving, storage, handling and maintaining nuclear weapons; the NSI failures and decertification’s just keep coming, why? The answer seems simple but certainly not obvious. Emphasis is required at the squadron commander, the operations officers and the remainder of the SNCOs, NCOs and airmen. As most old retired Munitions Officers will tell you failing NSIs is called “Experience.” Instead of firing those who have failed we need to re-train, counsel, recertify and encourage. We should be selecting and assigning the best 21M officers we can find as MMS squadron commanders (regardless of their “AFPC availability”) and they will have significant impact on unit performance and on educating their senior officers. We as an Air Force have over the last 15-20 years insisted that all an officer needs to be is a “good leader”, we don’t need officers who are experts? Officers are smart enough to understand that when your boss tells you to “get out from behind the fence (WSA) as soon as you can” if you want to get promoted, they do it. That might be great and savvy advice for an individual officer but it does great harm to our Air Force as an institution. This seems obvious, if “everyone” follows that career advice there will be “no-one” behind the fence (WSA) --- this can’t be what the CSAF has in mind?

The “nail in our coffin” was the 1991 merger of the aircraft maintenance officer AFSC (4024) and the munitions officer AFSC (4054). I personally made the mistake of supporting the merger because I too thought it would be good for promotion-I was thinking about my career. However, after being assigned as the HQ AF ILMW munitions division chief, I (1998) saw the unintended consequences, and realized the AFSC (4024/4054) merger was a huge mistake. There were many more aircraft maintenance officers than munitions officers, the DCMs (Colonels) were mostly aircraft maintenance officers [nothing wrong with that] and we all wanted to be in the “dominant tribe” of aircraft maintenance. The aircraft and munitions maintenance officer career fields were already merged at the field grade level but everyone including those crafty AFPC guys still knew who was aircraft maintenance and who was munitions maintenance because they could just look back at their assignment history which started out as either 4024 or 4054-and you can bet they assigned the field grade officers accordingly. When the AFSCs were merged completely it took about 20 years [one career length] to get all of the officers’ with an early assignment history of munitions experience purged. Officers were then assigned intentionally without regard for functional differences. In fact is has become almost a religious fervor to prevent the development of any “stove-piped” (read expertly knowledgeable and experienced) officers. The literature is filled with highly regarded research that no company can survive with the generalist management or the all-purpose MBA’s mentioned by Gabarro’s 1987 (Harvard Business School) 12 year longitudinal study. We just can’t get a break; the commercial world discovers the MBA generalist manager is a myth four years earlier than we adopt the MBA generalist officer model in maintenance? I hope it is never too late to say we are sorry and reverse course, we do need some experts if the generalist are going to have anyone to manage. lchandler@avesllc.com

My Thoughts on How to Mitigate the 21M Squadron Command Experience Gap



By Lt Col (ret) Brian Withrow

Here is my thought on how to mitigate the Air Force’s Munitions Officer “experience gap” of qualified candidates for nuclear munitions squadron command.  While there is no substitute for at least 10+ years of actual experience in nuclear munitions jobs, the AF could implement a rigorous one year WSA emersion program for a select number of thoroughly vetted 21M majors and senior captains with squadron command leadership potential.  As 21Ms, these folks should already have held at least one job in a MSA/WSA during their career.  Double billet these command candidates into WSAs with the sole, thoroughly scripted purpose of “deep emersion” into every facet of nuclear weapons management.  The key concept being “on-site” exposure, not some group academic classroom environment.  Expose to every duty section, place emphasis on the study of all relevant directives (AFI, T.O., JNWPS, etc…), and have them observe as many nuclear weapons operations as possible.  Send them TDY to observe NSI/DNSI team processes and send them to a couple mentoring encounters with retired munitions officers that were nuclear squadron commanders in the ‘80s & ‘90s.  If at the end of the one year emersion there isn’t a Munitions Squadron command billet available, then get them into a Maintenance Supervisor billet within a WSA or assign them to a NSI/DNSI team position until a command job comes open.

Unfortunately, I can’t claim this approach as some unique flash of brilliance on my part.  Similar methods have been successfully employed in the past.  One only needs to do a little research to reveal “skills gap” solutions from the corporate world on the internet.  This of coarse is only a “stop gap” measure.  The AF needs to acknowledge and fix how we got into this mess in the first place.  The AF needs to shift the personnel management focus from “career” development to experience development to meet supervision, command, and staff job skill requirements.  Over the past twenty years, mission support functional career field mergers and a flawed emphasis on career broadening resulted in many Field Grade Officers that know a little about a lot and have in-depth knowledge of very little.  21M Company Grade Officers require consecutive assignments in “core” munitions jobs to achieve the level of knowledge needed to have a reasonable expectation of mission effectiveness in 21M FGO billets.  And nuclear weapons experience is an even more focused specialization of 21M job knowledge.  The idea of the well-rounded (broadened), highly successful, plug them in to any job, general leader/manager is the rare exception, not the norm.  Yet this myth has persisted in the AF over the past 20 years.  Experience matters… don’t think so?  Then why not have your next brain surgery performed by a Family Practice Physician. Or closer to home, why aren’t some flying squadrons commanded by great maintenance leaders?  Hum, seems the “just need to be a good leader” philosophy only applies to mission support organizations. bnwithrow@hotmail.com

We have done so much, why are units still failing NSIs?

By Col (Ret) Larry Chandler

The AF has stood up Global Strike Command, commanded by a three star general; created an Air Staff Directorate (A-10) dedicated solely to nuclear weapons issues; stood up the AF Nuclear Weapons Center in Albuquerque and placed the management of all nuclear weapons storage areas (WSA) under the center’s management. Each of the three organizations (GSC, HQ AF/A-10 & AFNWC) has been manned by staffs (100s) and yet we continue to fail NSIs, why? The answer is simple; we have not addressed the core problem. At Minot in 2007 all of the errors, except the radar navigator not checking each missile safe-status, were errors in tasks that normally fall under munitions officers’ management. The bottom line is that the critical problems at Minot [and probably at other locations as well] were at the squadron level… and we are busy fixing the headquarters level problems?

After the ACC Command Directed Investigation (CDI), the CSAF Blue Ribbon Review (BRR), the Defense Science Board (DSB), the Schlesinger phase I & II and the USAF nuclear weapons roadmap (Reinvigorating the Nuclear Enterprise), there has still been no examination of the impact of the 1991 elimination the munitions officer AFSC (and the weapons safety officer positions). There are probably real problems at the headquarters levels and some of the reorganizations have been effective, the right thing to do - but the unintended consequences of eliminating the munitions officer AFSC in 1991 have been significant and yet remain to be discussed? When the munitions officer AFSC existed we had a dedicated professional set of officers who spent their entire career managing conventional munitions and nuclear weapons storage areas, weapons handling, weapons loading, armament systems, maintenance, safety, accountability, transportation, logistics and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD). These munitions officers managed the enlisted AFSCs for all of these functions. Supervising these enlisted functions in different major commands over the course of their careers provided munitions officers a common, deep understanding of conventional and nuclear weapons fundamentals [more in common than you might think---all designed to detonate] and provided Air Force senior leaders with good MMS squadron commanders and knowledgeable munitions staff officers at every level. These officers did, from time to time, fail NSIs and some officers’ careers took a hit because of those failures---some have held that is why the “logistics officer” community was so adamant about getting rid of “non-promotable officer AFSCs” (munitions officers). It was just too risky, career-wise to be in charge of the WSA (75% of the NSI pass/fail areas)---so if we spread out the risk and you only have to do it one time, you could get lucky and not be there when the failed NSI occurs---you might even be eventually promoted to general officer rank (few officers in the 1970s & 80s saw this as a realistic scenario---but look at us now---many more senior “logistics” officers now)?  Some people believe this to be at the core of our current organizational culture problems.

The munitions officers (prior to 1991) were not being “career broadened” to prepare them for some “to-be-determined” senior leadership position, they were providing the Air Force with safe, secure and reliable management of mission essential conventional munitions and nuclear weapons. These officers were interested in promotion, of course, but they did not have unrealistic expectations and there was very little careerism (not because they were saints but because it was just not realistic). We need to stop wringing our hands about whether we have created an attractive nuclear weapons career path for our best and brightest officers and do the right thing for the Air Force as an institution-“Needs of the service, remember?”. We should assign officers to munitions officer jobs because we desperately need full time professional management of this critical mission function (At the squadron level instead of at the HQ equipped with the famous 2,000 mile screwdriver). The Munitions Maintenance Squadron commander jobs should be filled with the best functionally experienced and qualified officer leadership, regardless of their availability (?), tour length, overseas return date, preparation for more senior leadership positions, attractive career paths and all the other fog factors which seem to be in vogue. Remember what Gen Curtis LeMay said, “We don’t have time to sort out the unlucky from the incompetent.” A new computer program is not the answer; all of the MAJCOM LGWs use to manage their munitions officers with notes on a yellow legal pad and the telephone on their desk – they actually KNEW them. We currently have the fewest WSAs and munitions officer positions since 1952 and someone thinks the answer is for AFPC to assign officers based on an SEI (OK, the DTs will do that; or do the DTs take care of fast-burners, schools and developmental assignments--we are preparing for those TBD more senior leadership positions)?

Prior to 1990, we had many WSAs, CONUS and OCONUS and many more munitions officers to manage and yet the MAJCOM LGWs knew all their munitions officers (major & above), working assignments that made sense for the wings, the numbered AFs, major commands, Air Force and then, when possible, for the individual officer’s career. The MAJCOM staffs, the Air Staff and the Joint Staffs were selectively manned, not just another computer generated assignment. Why? The reason was “for the good of the Air Force” and not the good of the individual officer. There were still problems and there were occasionally just poor-performing officers that got through the screening but for the most part, officers assigned to these staffs were the resident experts in munitions. The sharpest [combination of technical competence & leadership ability] munitions officers were assigned as MMS commanders and staff officers at every level; munitions officers were not usually groomed to be DCMs because those positions were normally aircraft maintenance officers (which made sense, “for the good of the maintenance complex). There were and always will be munitions officers with that more than normal leadership drive and there have been two munitions officers who rose to three star rank and became the HQ AF A4/7) However, the munitions officers’ value was their functional munitions experience and expertise in nuclear weapons and conventional munitions from the squadron to the joint staff---they were the ESSENTIAL stove-piped officers.

Somewhere we allowed someone to sell the USAF a bogus load of crap that all logistics officers should be generalist officers and that stove-piped munitions officers were less promotable, less valuable to the AF, none of which is true as has been painfully borne out by the Minot and Taiwan incidents. It seems incredible that the munitions officer career field merger with the aircraft maintenance officer career field did not surface during any of the post Minot/Taiwan incident high level investigations/studies? I wonder why? The BRR included a brief mention of the difference between 21Ms assigned to bomber units versus21Ms assigned to ICBM units but there was no mention of the potential impact of the career field merger diluting the munitions officer expertise as evidenced in the Minot incident? Are we going to have the leadership fortitude to “back up” and do the right thing for the Air Force instead of what is best for individual logistics officer’s careers? The jury is still out.

Oh, I almost forgot to answer the question, “Why are we are still failing NSIs?” Because we have not addressed the munitions & missile maintenance officer career field and the Air Force requirement for stove-piped, deeply expert officers. We need to assign the most experienced and deeply qualified munitions officers as munitions maintenance squadron commanders (we have the fewest WSAs since 1952 – so it is a small number) and we should stop trying to use the 3,000 mile headquarters screwdriver to control a squadron’s performance. The answer to why we are still failing NSIs is that we have not focused on the major/lieutenant colonel squadron commander. If we do, he/she will fix the squadrons. We continue to focus on the general officer but that is not the problem or the solution. lchandler@avesllc.com

Excerpt from ADM Rickover speech to Columbia University School of Engineering November 5, 1981

“The man in charge must concern himself with details. If he does not consider them important, neither will his subordinates. Yet "the devil is in the details." It is hard and monotonous to pay attention to seemingly minor matters. In my work I probably spend about 99 percent of my time on what others may call petty details. Most managers would rather focus on lofty policy matters. But when the details are ignored, the project fails. No infusion of policy or lofty ideals can then correct the situation.

There is concern today over the apparent decline in U.S. productivity. In searching for its causes we should not overlook the impact of the many professional administrators who run large corporations. Though trained in management at our leading universities, they [officers-in-charge, HQ staff division chiefs, officers, MMS/CCs, etc.] are often unskilled in the technical aspects of the company. As a result they manage largely in the terms they learned at school. Technical, operational, and production issues are quickly reduced to issues of numbers and dollars, upon which these administrators apply their management techniques.

Admiral Donald Report quotes - you will not see these published in normal channels

By Col (Ret) Larry Chandler

Admiral Donald identified a systemic lack of technical competence, “Individuals in leadership positions lacked the technical and professional experience necessary to effectively analyze problems and develop solutions” (p. 7).

Donald identified that, “there are some leaders with little, no, or dated nuclear [weapons] experience who hold leadership positions in the Air Force nuclear enterprise, including supervisors and enlisted members as well as squadron, group and wing commanders” (p. 47).

“Less than half of the 22 senior commanders had the required technical backgrounds for the positions they held (Donald, 2008). Admiral Donald observed “a lack of wing, group and squadron leadership on the floor of the WSAs [weapons storage areas] where build-up and disassembly of reentry systems occurs” (p. 47).

[How often does the boss show up where the work is done? No 10 speeches will equal one sincere visit and thoughtful interchange of ideas and discussion]

Important quotes you are not likely to see in Air Force literature

By Col (Ret) Larry Chandler

We need a few MMS commanders and staff officer division chiefs like those key employees described by Leonard & Swap in their HBR article.

Excerpt from Deep Smarts by Leonard & Swap

“When a person sizes up a complex situation and comes to a rapid decision that proves to be not just good but brilliant, you think, “That was smart.” After you’ve watched him do this a few times, you realize you’re in the presence of something special. It’s not raw brainpower, though that helps. It’s not emotional intelligence, either, though that, too, is often involved. It’s deep smarts, the stuff that produces that mysterious quality, good judgment. Those who have deep smarts can see the whole picture and yet zoom in on a specific problem others haven’t been able to diagnose. Almost intuitively, they can make the right decision, at the right level, with the right people” (Leonard & Swap, 2003, p. 2).

“Throughout your organization, there are people with deep smarts. Their judgment and knowledge—both explicit and tacit—are stored in their heads and hands. Their knowledge is essential. The organization cannot progress without it. You will be a more effective manager if you understand what deep smarts are, how they are cultivated, and how they can be transferred from one person to another” (Leonard & Swap, 2003, p. 2).

Excerpt from Cambridge Handbook of Experts & Expertise

Bill Gates, “Take away our best 20 people and Microsoft would become an unimportant company” (Becker, 2002, p. 8 quoted in the Cambridge Handbook of Experts & Expertise, 2006, p. 14).

I wonder if this applies to taking away the most expert (stove-piped) munitions officers from the AF munitions career field and leaving in place a cadre of “broadly qualified logistics officers who are well prepared for some future more senior logistics officer positions,” would this be similar to Bill Gates comment?

Commanders and Their QA

By Lt Col Earl Bennett

A few years ago shortly after I took command of a munitions squadron, I received my first brief from my Quality Assurance chief who proceeded to tell me how well things were going in our unit as evidenced by our nearly 100% pass rate on QA evals and inspections.  I had already been in command for about a month when this occurred, and I had already been doing some “spot checks” of my own as I walked around the various shops and around the Munitions Storage Area.  I listened to my QA chief tell me how well our maintenance troops performed on their evaluations and then I said something like this: “well, that’s amazing we have such a high pass rate.  As the Chief and I have walked around the squadron, I’ve noticed we have some pretty poor housekeeping practices.  I’ve also noticed we don’t do a good job keeping equipment forms up to date.  So, you must not be looking at these things in your QA Plan?” 

After an uncomfortable silence, my QA team admitted that perhaps they could tailor their program to focus on these areas.  The Chief, I, and my QA sat down and we decided we could do more inspections in these areas as well as tighten up our overall program.  We also agreed that a 99% QA pass rate might not be the best indicator of the quality of our maintenance if we weren’t looking at everything or looking at things critically enough.  We agreed to revamp the QA Plan, and revisit on our next meeting.

Interestingly enough, QA found some of the same things the Chief and I had found in our walk-around.  They wrote them up, and briefed the chain of command.  It was amazing how fast the word spread throughout the squadron, and everyone tightened up their adherence to standards.  We still had failures, and we learned from them; both the technicians and leadership.

The story doesn’t end here; our objective is a continual journey to meet the exacting standards required in the munitions arena while supporting the mission.  The cost of failing to hold that standard is just too high, and we must never grow comfortable in reading the latest statistics from our QA or some other source to tell us all is well.  Leaders, at all levels need to know their business just as well as their technicians and their QA.  Nothing commands the respect of your people as much as a maintenance leader knowing and comprehending the intricate details of the munitions business.  A word of advice, this knowledge doesn’t come from sitting at your desk and answering emails; munitions officers need to be out with their people perfecting our trade.  That’s called leadership.

A Look Back… Maintenance Flight Commander

By Capt Josh Trebon

One purpose of this blog is to share experiences of the trade with fellow 21Ms. That being said, what does a 21M really need to know to be successful? I have heard repeatedly that good officership is all that is needed to accomplish any task, just focus on your profession as a military leader and you will be successful. However, I think that is painfully misleading. So what does a 21M need to know to successfully accomplish the mission? There is no blanket answer because even though munitions is often mistakenly looked at as a narrow “stove-piped” career field, it’s really huge (almost 400 pages of TTP – XX) and diverse. However, what I can offer for this discussion is my personal experience as a Weapons Maintenance Flight Commander at a MUNSS in USAFE.

The following is a description of a typical day, and the tools of the trade I employed to ensure my flight’s commitment and performance. Hopefully some of what I learned may be helpful to other 21Ms tasked with similar jobs.

The key to my success at the MUNSS was building trust amongst those who worked for me.  I tried to do this through very simple gestures. For instance, show up early before the troops each morning and be the last to leave, be confident, and establish buy-in by listening and sharing your decision logic. However, remember the flight is not a democracy, take advice, but the decisions, responsibility and any repercussions are all yours.  You always defer the praise to those who work for you and claim for yourself the things that went wrong. That is what being in charge means to me.  It has become somewhat of a cliché, but I really do believe we have to manage by walking about. Know your troops professionally and personally, always go to bat for your troops when warranted, but if people screw up, hold them accountable, enforce integrity and accountability, and uphold compliance. Our behavior as leaders is where a compliance culture comes from… behavior, not just words.

I found that everyday there was an opportunity to ensure technical orders, work orders, instructions, etc. were followed to the letter! I made it clear that it did not matter if my flight could do their jobs in their sleep, we must always enforce using the regulating document to carry out tasks. For example, when I had my accountability section process Weapons Status Reports (WSR), I enforced the use of TP 100-3150 throughout the process, to include line-by-line Quality Control (QC). The extra 10 minutes of review, saved us multiple hours of correction and MFRs to fix any errors. This is how organizational high reliability cultures are established… by what the boss “will allow.”

Day-to-day workings of the shop should follow right along with the compliance culture concept. I would start every day off with a stop in Munitions Control. Review the schedule (set at the weekly scheduling meeting with all section chiefs), review the work orders for the day and week, review manning and know the location of all flight personnel (comes in handy for contingencies and impromptu exercises), review work orders with Munitions Control, Accountability Section and Weapons Maintenance Section (ensures all are on the same page). Once this is done, meet with the Maintenance Operations Officer (MOO) to brief what the flight has going on that day. It was important to ask the MOO to occasionally sit in on the scheduling meeting from time-to-time as well. However, bottom-line is to always keep the MOO informed on what is going on… the same goes for the Squadron Commander. Once I felt like I had my house in order for the day, then I would get some administrative work out of the way. After that, as I eluded to earlier, “un-ass” the desk and get out and about again. Stop in all sections and see what’s going on, check on all the items reviewed on the work orders and flight schedule from earlier that morning. If sections needed anything to finish tasks or if work is behind schedule then it was time to “do something,” to get them back on schedule. 

In order to ensure my troops had the tools they needed to accomplish the mission, I was always interested to see what training was going on. I wanted to ensure pertinent information was flowing to Munitions Control or any other section that needs to know how to do the really important stuff (e.g., emergency procedures, safety, line number/fire symbol updates, etc.). Above all follow up, I trust but verify. Don’t just sit around and assume that because the training is on schedule that it is being accomplished and/or being done right. Remember “we” are fostering a compliance culture by where we go and what we do all day, not by what we “say.”  At the end of the day I would take an “officer-in-charge” review of my flight’s work orders---have they all come back? No one working on a maintenance team should go home until the work order is completed back into Munitions Control and all tools are checked back into the tool room. My section NCOICs knew I was paying attention, they were paying attention as well and we had a great team, but in my opinion this starts with a knowledgeable and active Flight Commander. As Company Grade Officers we really do make a difference in mission accomplishment.

There were a wide-range of tools and knowledge I had to learn. There were many technical orders, instructions, etc. that directly impacted the flight’s day-to-day operations. How could I ensure a compliance culture unless I understood what the troops had to do?  I always tried to have a copy of these documents at hand; AFI 21-204 & 101, AFI 91-101,104 & 112, and AFMAN 91-201.  I also sought to learn and understand how each section in the flight interrelated (one team one fight). For a MUNSS this was a complex relationship, because security forces, communications, command post, services, and the command section had to function as a single team. To know what all the other sections had going on I listened intently at the SQ/CC’s weekly scheduling meeting so I could try to harmonize my operations with theirs.

Understand the relationship with your Host Nation (HN). This is maybe one of the most important aspects of a MUNSS. Since most dealings with the HN fall to Weapons Maintenance and Security Forces (SF), it was up to me and the SF Commander to foster a good working relationship.  When I was in the Flight Commander seat I would do lunch with the HN representatives, attend their scheduling meetings, and in particular, stop by HN Wing Ops, the Chief of Maintenance Office, and the Fire Chiefs Office frequently throughout the week, sometimes only to chat. It is a good idea to foster a good HN working relationship. Ensure the HN has buy-in early in your decision making process, especially scheduling. Leaving the HN in the dark and demanding assistance will lead to mission failure and definitely an “UNSAT” and a “re-inspect” at NSI time.

Last of all, I tried to learn everything I could about Weapons Safety… this has to be known “down pat”. Keep the Weapons Safety Office in the loop at all times, remember they assist greatly in ensuring your compliance culture.

I hope this rambling about my experience at a MUNSS proves helpful. The main take-aways are that we must know what the troops do, know what guidance rules our work, always “live” and enforce a compliance culture, hold the troops and ourselves accountable, and establish and nurture the key working relationships needed to ensure successful mission accomplishment. All these tips may seem “no-brainers”, however, recent events indicate that we need to reacquaint ourselves with the fundamentals. If you agree or disagree with me, let me know, submit a counter or complementary post or contact me directly. josh_trebon@hotmail.com

What Does a Munitions Maintenance Squadron Commander Really Do?



By Col (Ret) Larry Chandler and Lt Col (Ret) Brian Withrow

What does a Munitions Maintenance Squadron commander really do? Think back and remember what made your best squadron commander the best? What did that commander do that was so special? We “old-timers” talked about this topic and what follows is a discussion of our collective experiences.

First, we can’t start this discussion about the MMS commander until after we have talked about the top of the old maintenance food-chain. The Deputy Commander for Maintenance (DCM) was “God”. The DCM knew all there was to know about maintenance and if you could survive morning standup (for which we were all seated) then it was going to be a good day. Surviving meant one of two things, either you had not been called on to answer a question or miraculously you were called on but had a good answer (a right versus wrong answer). In our days, as opposed to today, “I don’t know” was not a good answer. As BGen Atkinson wrote in a recent Exceptional Release (EA) article, if your boss asks you what is the population of Australia and it is not your job to know the answer, then “I don’t know” is OK. But if your boss asks you what the munitions loads are for tomorrow’s flyers… it is NOT ok to say “I don’t know.” It is your job to know---and to know all the preparation and planning have been done right.

Now of course even “back then” many DCMs did not know all there was to know about maintenance. Many were pilots who were out of flying duties for whatever reason and were colonels, so they had to be somewhere and maintenance was available? But we don’t sell these colonels short because remember these colonels had been “consumers” of maintenance and even though they might not have been knowledgeable about how maintenance was done, they did recognize when the product was good and when it was bad. These colonels learned fast and always had a seasoned deputy who had done most of the jobs in maintenance or worked “in the business so long they were extremely knowledgeable. So the colonel (DCM) and his deputy were really managing the entire maintenance complex and this was their profession. What did we talk about? Was it Air Power, was it officership, was it how to get promoted to general officer… nope, it was maintenance, just maintenance.

Most of us would have been excited at the thought of being promoted to lieutenant colonel and getting to command a MMS. This is a long-long time ago in the “bad old days” when becoming a squadron commander was not the first step in the process to become a general officer… it was a dream come true and the pot of gold at the rainbows end! Few officers achieved such distinction and honor. Nobody I ever talked to was trying to hurry and finish their squadron commander job, they were practicing their argument with the DCM to let them command a larger squadron or get an assignment to command OCONUS. If you were really up for the big time, there was an extremely “outside” chance to command a MUNSS in USAFE or one of the three Aviation Depot Squadrons (you were a knowledgeable insider if you just knew what these AVDSs were), or the 400^th MMS.

So, what did MMS commanders do? They certainly knew their business and if they didn’t they did not last long. Now to be fair, this was the good old days when MMS/CCs had orderly rooms and staff, so the commander’s focus was the mission. They knew who was doing what in the squadron and they knew their strong and weak officers and assigned them accordingly. In the munitions business when things go wrong you really have a bad day. Remember that all our “stuff” is actually designed to blow up and kill people. So if you don’t follow the rules you might kill your own people and in the midst of combat operations, you might stop the entire wing or even the entire AF from accomplishing the mission. Yes, it is a very big deal to be a munitions officer. The joke use to be even the DCM might not know your name, but if munitions blow up in the storage area or on the flightline or don’t fall off the airplane as designed, or fall off the airplane when they are not supposed to, everyone will know your name, especially if you are the MMS commander.

Usually the MMS commander had been the OIC of the storage area (MSA or WSA or both), he had been a services/weapons loading/armament officer, been the OIC missiles and always had an explosives/weapons safety job (if he could not get out of it). Of course when the MMS/CC was a lieutenant he had been a MASO or had grown up with the supply officer who was one, it was the bottom of the food chain. I know this is different today. We think of the MASO as the youngest officer in the squadron but we also think the MASO is the most highly skilled and trained officer that nobody in the squadron knows what they do or how they do it (you know DIAMONDS---ooh aah, is such complicated software/hardware?). There was a time when we all had to the be the MASO as a rite of passage and every officer up our MMS chain of command had already done that job done this operation before, I was confident they would perform well without the need of my direct supervision.”

This is the condensed version of the mishap story, but suffice it to say that when I, Maintenance Supervision, QA, and Armament Flight leadership convened to reflect on the lessons learned from the investigation, we all agreed that the record of success that had been achieved with much effort had a down side; overconfidence and complacency were creeping in.  In our business the need to stay vigilant never ends. The Group and Wing Commander’s confidence was understandably shaken. The young airman required multiple surgeries and did recover, but I shutter to think that he could have been killed. Moral of the story…don’t let your guard down even when all appears excellent, expect the unexpected from unexpected places, and as a wise President Reagan put it… always “trust but verify.” lchandler@avesllc.com

Why Have Officers?

By Col (Ret) Larry Chandler

Why have an officer AFSC if the officers are not expected to know what maintenance is planned or done? Why have officers if they don’t recognize poor work when they see it being done? In Lt Gen Perry Smith’s book, Taking Charge, two of the top 20 to-do list includes: (7) Leaders must not condone incompetence...and are responsible for ensuring the mission is accomplished, (10) Leaders must subordinate their ambitions and egos to the goals of the unit. In an MMS, The CC, Maintenance Supervisor and the flight commander should not be passive; they should have their foot-prints all over the squadron, ensuring the mission is accomplished.  When I read one of the Minot reports, one statement jumped off the page and stuck in my throat. Paraphrased the statement was: the failures were primarily Non-Commissioned Officers and Senior Non-Commissioned Officers not doing their jobs. The information on the squadron maintenance plans & schedule were not “given” to the Squadron Commander and Maintenance Supervisor (I refuse to use the term MOO)? In an MMS there is a commander, maintenance supervisor, a MASO and flight commanders, these officers should not wait to be “given” information---they should KNOW (& approve or change) what is going on and who is doing what and whether maintenance is being done right! It is their job to know! If no one in the squadron is using the squadron maintenance plan/schedule and the first time anyone knows is when a MAJCOM investigation reveals the fact, then that is called a poor command climate & culture---set from the top. Real officers don’t throw the NCOs under the bus when the train comes off the track; we have officers for a reason and they should lead.

I appreciate how important NCOs are to any unit and since my date of rank as an AMMO Master Sergeant was 1 June 1976, can speak with some authority on this issue of officer-enlisted working relationships. I was the NCOIC of Munitions Inspection Section at George AFB CA, We were “Best MMS in TAC”, (1976) and my squadron commander was Major Monte Crook. Major Crook was an F-4 pilot but he BECAME a munitions officer through great effort. He had been a customer and “used” a lot of bombs, bullets and missiles---he made it his business to know the munitions business. He had tremendous credibility with all of us because he did not wait for anyone to tell him anything—and he always made the effort to know the details (Not 9 lines on a PowerPoint slide). Bottom line: officers need to know their business and not just “fail” if their NCOs don’t GIVE them the right information! If an officer does not know his/her business how will they be able to appreciate great maintenance or recognize poor maintenance---until it is too late?

Prior to the Minot incident, there was a push toward developing a “Utility Infielder” support officer concept--a general purpose officer. The baseball analogy would be--second basemen are easy to find and if you are building a team, you can get by with hiring all second basemen to play all infielder positions. This option is cheaper and simpler but it is doubtful this team will win the World Series against teams with left handed first basemen.

Officers need to know their business and understand the details of their mission. For example, BGen Jimmy Doolittle who led the bombing mission on Tokyo after the U.S. was attacked at Pearl Harbor, WWII. Gen Doolittle was an expert pilot but also was an Aeronautical Engineer and held a doctorate in aeronautics from MIT. Why was then “Lt Col” Doolittle able to do the impossible when the country desperately needed someone to lead this extremely dangerous and important mission? He was not a “generalist,” he was an “expert” and a leader---he selected the aircraft, the B-25 bomber, designed and managed the aircraft fuel system modification to maximize fuel capacity, he selected and trained the aircrews; and he led the mission flying the lead aircraft off the deck of the carrier. He completely understood, better than any of those he led, all the facets of the mission—he made the decision to launch a full day earlier because a Japanese fishing boat spotted the carrier and he had to assume the Japanese would be alerted to the attack. He was able to make the launch decision because he knew all the details (the aircraft, the crews and the mission). It would be impossible to have all Gen Doolittle-caliber 21M officers & commanders (a team of all quarterbacks would not work anyway) but the principle is sound--- the officer in charge should know all there is to know about the organization they lead---an obvious goal. Officer AFSCs, the 21M matters greatly explosive safety and nuclear surety are responsibilities that can win or lose on a National Security level. OK, now I will get off my soap box. lchandler@avesllc.com