Are we fixing the right stuff? The MMS!

By Col (ret) Larry Chandler

OK, we have reorganized the entire Air Force again, now we have a new Air Staff directorate (A-10), a new major command, AF Global Strike Command (AFGSC) and the AF Nuclear Weapons Center (AFNWC), significant changes to be sure but if I remember correctly it was a couple of SSgts, a TSgt or two and a couple of SNCO’s who made most of the mistakes at Minot, August 2007? A quote in the Command Directed Report of Investigation (CDI 2007) was revealing, “The catalyst for the failures began in the scheduling process. It further broke down because the supervisors, predominantly the non-commissioned officers and the senior non-commissioned officers did not do their jobs” (p.38). The mistakes were made from the squadron commander level down to the one striper airman level. There is no doubt the officer leadership at Minot was relieved and or disciplined but it seems all of the focus has been on corrective action at the strategic level --- not the inner workings of the Munitions Maintenance Squadron (MMS). There have been several more wing and group commanders relieved of command since the Minot incident because we continue to have problems in moving, storage, handling and maintaining nuclear weapons; the NSI failures and decertification’s just keep coming, why? The answer seems simple but certainly not obvious. Emphasis is required at the squadron commander, the operations officers and the remainder of the SNCOs, NCOs and airmen. As most old retired Munitions Officers will tell you failing NSIs is called “Experience.” Instead of firing those who have failed we need to re-train, counsel, recertify and encourage. We should be selecting and assigning the best 21M officers we can find as MMS squadron commanders (regardless of their “AFPC availability”) and they will have significant impact on unit performance and on educating their senior officers. We as an Air Force have over the last 15-20 years insisted that all an officer needs to be is a “good leader”, we don’t need officers who are experts? Officers are smart enough to understand that when your boss tells you to “get out from behind the fence (WSA) as soon as you can” if you want to get promoted, they do it. That might be great and savvy advice for an individual officer but it does great harm to our Air Force as an institution. This seems obvious, if “everyone” follows that career advice there will be “no-one” behind the fence (WSA) --- this can’t be what the CSAF has in mind?

The “nail in our coffin” was the 1991 merger of the aircraft maintenance officer AFSC (4024) and the munitions officer AFSC (4054). I personally made the mistake of supporting the merger because I too thought it would be good for promotion-I was thinking about my career. However, after being assigned as the HQ AF ILMW munitions division chief, I (1998) saw the unintended consequences, and realized the AFSC (4024/4054) merger was a huge mistake. There were many more aircraft maintenance officers than munitions officers, the DCMs (Colonels) were mostly aircraft maintenance officers [nothing wrong with that] and we all wanted to be in the “dominant tribe” of aircraft maintenance. The aircraft and munitions maintenance officer career fields were already merged at the field grade level but everyone including those crafty AFPC guys still knew who was aircraft maintenance and who was munitions maintenance because they could just look back at their assignment history which started out as either 4024 or 4054-and you can bet they assigned the field grade officers accordingly. When the AFSCs were merged completely it took about 20 years [one career length] to get all of the officers’ with an early assignment history of munitions experience purged. Officers were then assigned intentionally without regard for functional differences. In fact is has become almost a religious fervor to prevent the development of any “stove-piped” (read expertly knowledgeable and experienced) officers. The literature is filled with highly regarded research that no company can survive with the generalist management or the all-purpose MBA’s mentioned by Gabarro’s 1987 (Harvard Business School) 12 year longitudinal study. We just can’t get a break; the commercial world discovers the MBA generalist manager is a myth four years earlier than we adopt the MBA generalist officer model in maintenance? I hope it is never too late to say we are sorry and reverse course, we do need some experts if the generalist are going to have anyone to manage. lchandler@avesllc.com

My Thoughts on How to Mitigate the 21M Squadron Command Experience Gap



By Lt Col (ret) Brian Withrow

Here is my thought on how to mitigate the Air Force’s Munitions Officer “experience gap” of qualified candidates for nuclear munitions squadron command.  While there is no substitute for at least 10+ years of actual experience in nuclear munitions jobs, the AF could implement a rigorous one year WSA emersion program for a select number of thoroughly vetted 21M majors and senior captains with squadron command leadership potential.  As 21Ms, these folks should already have held at least one job in a MSA/WSA during their career.  Double billet these command candidates into WSAs with the sole, thoroughly scripted purpose of “deep emersion” into every facet of nuclear weapons management.  The key concept being “on-site” exposure, not some group academic classroom environment.  Expose to every duty section, place emphasis on the study of all relevant directives (AFI, T.O., JNWPS, etc…), and have them observe as many nuclear weapons operations as possible.  Send them TDY to observe NSI/DNSI team processes and send them to a couple mentoring encounters with retired munitions officers that were nuclear squadron commanders in the ‘80s & ‘90s.  If at the end of the one year emersion there isn’t a Munitions Squadron command billet available, then get them into a Maintenance Supervisor billet within a WSA or assign them to a NSI/DNSI team position until a command job comes open.

Unfortunately, I can’t claim this approach as some unique flash of brilliance on my part.  Similar methods have been successfully employed in the past.  One only needs to do a little research to reveal “skills gap” solutions from the corporate world on the internet.  This of coarse is only a “stop gap” measure.  The AF needs to acknowledge and fix how we got into this mess in the first place.  The AF needs to shift the personnel management focus from “career” development to experience development to meet supervision, command, and staff job skill requirements.  Over the past twenty years, mission support functional career field mergers and a flawed emphasis on career broadening resulted in many Field Grade Officers that know a little about a lot and have in-depth knowledge of very little.  21M Company Grade Officers require consecutive assignments in “core” munitions jobs to achieve the level of knowledge needed to have a reasonable expectation of mission effectiveness in 21M FGO billets.  And nuclear weapons experience is an even more focused specialization of 21M job knowledge.  The idea of the well-rounded (broadened), highly successful, plug them in to any job, general leader/manager is the rare exception, not the norm.  Yet this myth has persisted in the AF over the past 20 years.  Experience matters… don’t think so?  Then why not have your next brain surgery performed by a Family Practice Physician. Or closer to home, why aren’t some flying squadrons commanded by great maintenance leaders?  Hum, seems the “just need to be a good leader” philosophy only applies to mission support organizations. bnwithrow@hotmail.com

We have done so much, why are units still failing NSIs?

By Col (Ret) Larry Chandler

The AF has stood up Global Strike Command, commanded by a three star general; created an Air Staff Directorate (A-10) dedicated solely to nuclear weapons issues; stood up the AF Nuclear Weapons Center in Albuquerque and placed the management of all nuclear weapons storage areas (WSA) under the center’s management. Each of the three organizations (GSC, HQ AF/A-10 & AFNWC) has been manned by staffs (100s) and yet we continue to fail NSIs, why? The answer is simple; we have not addressed the core problem. At Minot in 2007 all of the errors, except the radar navigator not checking each missile safe-status, were errors in tasks that normally fall under munitions officers’ management. The bottom line is that the critical problems at Minot [and probably at other locations as well] were at the squadron level… and we are busy fixing the headquarters level problems?

After the ACC Command Directed Investigation (CDI), the CSAF Blue Ribbon Review (BRR), the Defense Science Board (DSB), the Schlesinger phase I & II and the USAF nuclear weapons roadmap (Reinvigorating the Nuclear Enterprise), there has still been no examination of the impact of the 1991 elimination the munitions officer AFSC (and the weapons safety officer positions). There are probably real problems at the headquarters levels and some of the reorganizations have been effective, the right thing to do - but the unintended consequences of eliminating the munitions officer AFSC in 1991 have been significant and yet remain to be discussed? When the munitions officer AFSC existed we had a dedicated professional set of officers who spent their entire career managing conventional munitions and nuclear weapons storage areas, weapons handling, weapons loading, armament systems, maintenance, safety, accountability, transportation, logistics and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD). These munitions officers managed the enlisted AFSCs for all of these functions. Supervising these enlisted functions in different major commands over the course of their careers provided munitions officers a common, deep understanding of conventional and nuclear weapons fundamentals [more in common than you might think---all designed to detonate] and provided Air Force senior leaders with good MMS squadron commanders and knowledgeable munitions staff officers at every level. These officers did, from time to time, fail NSIs and some officers’ careers took a hit because of those failures---some have held that is why the “logistics officer” community was so adamant about getting rid of “non-promotable officer AFSCs” (munitions officers). It was just too risky, career-wise to be in charge of the WSA (75% of the NSI pass/fail areas)---so if we spread out the risk and you only have to do it one time, you could get lucky and not be there when the failed NSI occurs---you might even be eventually promoted to general officer rank (few officers in the 1970s & 80s saw this as a realistic scenario---but look at us now---many more senior “logistics” officers now)?  Some people believe this to be at the core of our current organizational culture problems.

The munitions officers (prior to 1991) were not being “career broadened” to prepare them for some “to-be-determined” senior leadership position, they were providing the Air Force with safe, secure and reliable management of mission essential conventional munitions and nuclear weapons. These officers were interested in promotion, of course, but they did not have unrealistic expectations and there was very little careerism (not because they were saints but because it was just not realistic). We need to stop wringing our hands about whether we have created an attractive nuclear weapons career path for our best and brightest officers and do the right thing for the Air Force as an institution-“Needs of the service, remember?”. We should assign officers to munitions officer jobs because we desperately need full time professional management of this critical mission function (At the squadron level instead of at the HQ equipped with the famous 2,000 mile screwdriver). The Munitions Maintenance Squadron commander jobs should be filled with the best functionally experienced and qualified officer leadership, regardless of their availability (?), tour length, overseas return date, preparation for more senior leadership positions, attractive career paths and all the other fog factors which seem to be in vogue. Remember what Gen Curtis LeMay said, “We don’t have time to sort out the unlucky from the incompetent.” A new computer program is not the answer; all of the MAJCOM LGWs use to manage their munitions officers with notes on a yellow legal pad and the telephone on their desk – they actually KNEW them. We currently have the fewest WSAs and munitions officer positions since 1952 and someone thinks the answer is for AFPC to assign officers based on an SEI (OK, the DTs will do that; or do the DTs take care of fast-burners, schools and developmental assignments--we are preparing for those TBD more senior leadership positions)?

Prior to 1990, we had many WSAs, CONUS and OCONUS and many more munitions officers to manage and yet the MAJCOM LGWs knew all their munitions officers (major & above), working assignments that made sense for the wings, the numbered AFs, major commands, Air Force and then, when possible, for the individual officer’s career. The MAJCOM staffs, the Air Staff and the Joint Staffs were selectively manned, not just another computer generated assignment. Why? The reason was “for the good of the Air Force” and not the good of the individual officer. There were still problems and there were occasionally just poor-performing officers that got through the screening but for the most part, officers assigned to these staffs were the resident experts in munitions. The sharpest [combination of technical competence & leadership ability] munitions officers were assigned as MMS commanders and staff officers at every level; munitions officers were not usually groomed to be DCMs because those positions were normally aircraft maintenance officers (which made sense, “for the good of the maintenance complex). There were and always will be munitions officers with that more than normal leadership drive and there have been two munitions officers who rose to three star rank and became the HQ AF A4/7) However, the munitions officers’ value was their functional munitions experience and expertise in nuclear weapons and conventional munitions from the squadron to the joint staff---they were the ESSENTIAL stove-piped officers.

Somewhere we allowed someone to sell the USAF a bogus load of crap that all logistics officers should be generalist officers and that stove-piped munitions officers were less promotable, less valuable to the AF, none of which is true as has been painfully borne out by the Minot and Taiwan incidents. It seems incredible that the munitions officer career field merger with the aircraft maintenance officer career field did not surface during any of the post Minot/Taiwan incident high level investigations/studies? I wonder why? The BRR included a brief mention of the difference between 21Ms assigned to bomber units versus21Ms assigned to ICBM units but there was no mention of the potential impact of the career field merger diluting the munitions officer expertise as evidenced in the Minot incident? Are we going to have the leadership fortitude to “back up” and do the right thing for the Air Force instead of what is best for individual logistics officer’s careers? The jury is still out.

Oh, I almost forgot to answer the question, “Why are we are still failing NSIs?” Because we have not addressed the munitions & missile maintenance officer career field and the Air Force requirement for stove-piped, deeply expert officers. We need to assign the most experienced and deeply qualified munitions officers as munitions maintenance squadron commanders (we have the fewest WSAs since 1952 – so it is a small number) and we should stop trying to use the 3,000 mile headquarters screwdriver to control a squadron’s performance. The answer to why we are still failing NSIs is that we have not focused on the major/lieutenant colonel squadron commander. If we do, he/she will fix the squadrons. We continue to focus on the general officer but that is not the problem or the solution. lchandler@avesllc.com