By Master Sergeant, Colonel (Ret) Dr. Larry Chandler
A long, long, long time ago in the U.S. Air Force, when munitions officers roamed the bomb dumps, weapons storage areas and EOD ranges, there were many of the world’s greatest pilots commanding munitions maintenance squadrons (MMS). AF policy at this time was based on the belief there were not enough flying squadron command billets for their elite officers (e.g., distinguished pilots) so some were assigned to command maintenance squadrons. I know this sounds strange today, but back then most of us were pretty convinced there were not going to be more than a handful of munitions officer colonels. The very best munitions officers sometimes were promoted to colonel and assigned as a major command director of munitions (LGW). HQ Air Force and AFPC believed there was no real harm in using maintenance squadron commander assignments as developmental jobs for high-potential fighter pilots. Air Force senior leaders (i.e., also pilots) wanted to get as many of their promising aviators some experience leading and managing enlisted personnel. After all, many of these pilots were going to be promoted to colonel and a few might become general officer so they needed the command experience. Of course the career maintenance officers did grumble about this situation not being fair but that was normal, if you ran into a maintenance officer not grumbling about something you might want to call medical help? So grumbling and the unfair part aside, this system seemed to senior AF leadership to work and here is why.
Fighter/bomber pilots know a lot more about munitions, missiles and weapons than most officers because it is their profession to employ munitions; if the munitions and weapons don’t work as designed they could die in combat. One of the best squadron commanders I ever worked for was an F-4E fighter pilot, Major Monte Crook at the 35th MMS. He did not know how to manage a MMS but he did know a lot about the munitions he employed in combat and he worked hard to learn all about our processes. He did not sit in his office getting briefings, he was everywhere, and on all three shifts…the bomb dump, the flightline, maintenance and inspection, he watched the AMMO trucks come into the storage area and learned the process of in-checking, inspection, accountability and storage according to compatibility group. He worked with the weapons loaders until he understood what it took to get a crew certified and keep them certified…he learned how load crews are managed to make sure all the aircraft scheduled get loaded at the right time. But the only reason Major Crook could survive as a generalist is that he had a cadre of expert munitions officers who knew their business inside out…they were not preparing for some future big job, they were already in it! In other words, the MMS commander was the only officer in the squadron that was in a competency-broadening assignment…every other officer was in a competency-using assignment.
In contrast, fast forward to today when all the officers might be on a career broadening assignment. There was an opportunity cost to the USAF in assigning Major Crook as the 35th MMS commander, but it was manageable then. In August 2007, most of the officers in the Minot AFB WSA were inexperienced and all of the company grade officers were being rotated to work on the flightline for career broadening (e.g., quarterly). The result is that as Admiral Donald indicated in his investigation report on the Taiwan incident, “over half of the senior officers were not qualified to lead the organizations they commanded” (Donald, 2008, p. 47). If the squadron commander does not believe he or she needs to be sufficiently knowledgeable to manage the details of squadron operations, how will the other officers in the squadron see their role? Admiral Rickover, Father of the nuclear Navy, spoke to an audience at Columbia University in 1982 and said that if the boss does not believe the details are important neither will his staff…hence no one will be paying attention to the details (i.e., Minot-Barksdale incident).
We may have forgotten what a powerful motivator it is to “know you are really good at what you do, and how demotivating it is for officers to be continually assigned to jobs they have had no preparation for… compelling them to consider that they have little credibility with those they lead. If there is only one officer in the squadron who is career broadening, the squadron might be able to perform without major failure, but we currently encourage all non-rated officers to career broaden. Some officer resumes I have seen measure assignment length not in years but rather in months. So, how is career broadening working today?
After 20+ years of encouraging munitions officers not to get stuck in a single career field stovepipe, that maintenance officers should be logisticians not “just” munitions and missile maintenance officers, generalist logisticians (whoever they are and whatever they do?) are as thick as sand fleas. I would have said as thick as 13S officers but one must not exaggerate too much. Now a MUNS can be staffed by junior officers in jobs they have never done before, working for a supervisor who has never done any of their jobs before, and working for a MUNS commander who is a missile and space operator (13S), aircraft maintenance officer (21A) with no prior munitions or nuclear weapons maintenance experience. I guess in this scenario, the Air University ACSC or AWC advice to new commanders about relying on their “experts” and not trying to change things too quickly does not offer much help. Who is doing the mentoring? One argument offered in defense is that all the technical expertise needed is resident in the NCO corps, but this begs the question, “how do the officers know” if operations are working effectively if few or none of them are knowledgeable in the munitions and weapons career fields?
Generalist (i.e., career broadeners) are OK, but only in small numbers and not in key leadership positions otherwise sports teams would be all “utility infielders” and the NFL teams would have “utility” defensive backs playing quarterback. While this seems to be common sense, the CSAF wanted maintenance officers to be “utility infielder officers” by merging AFSCs to get a broadened generalist officer…even after the Minot-Barksdale incident in 2007? Is the concept you should understand the work of those you lead so difficult to understand?
OK, one last example and I will stop. If you are a general officer, let’s say the HQ AF A4L for example, and working on a very difficult and challenging problem, who do you want sitting around your staff table…5 colonels who are all alike (i.e., “logistics” colonels…jack of all trades but master of none) in that they have each done a little of this and a little of that functionally, plus some duties such as an executive officer, leadership fellowships, etc… while being developed for more senior jobs? Or an alternate option… 5 of the most experienced, deeply expert colonels from their respective functional career fields (e.g., aircraft maintenance, munitions and missile maintenance, logistics readiness or even better, supply, transportation and plans)?
Kotter (1982) found senior general and functional managers claimed to be generalist, but they were, in fact, deeply expert in their own company processes, products, services, industry and were deeply connected through a network of peers in the same industry. These “general” managers rarely transitioned to new industries or businesses and there was a high failure rate for those few who did. Similarly, MAJCOM and Air Staff functional colonels use to know everyone in their functional areas, there was a professional communications network that kept them informed and knowledgeable on the details of their specialties. When you have that depth of expertise and experience, you and your staff are working from strength not weakness. I know which scenario I would choose.
My theory is that “in the end, “there can be only one!” (Generalist) … and I recommend we address him or her as, “General.” Since less than one percent of the officer corps will ever rise to general officer rank, we need to stop trying to develop every officer as if promotion to general officer is a realistic goal, and we need to focus instead on developing the 99% of officers so they will have the mission critical munitions and missiles and nuclear weapons maintenance management expertise and experience. Let’s choose organizational mission performance over careerism.
NOTE: Lt Col Jimmy Doolittle was not a generalist, he was an expert pilot, he had a PhD in aeronautical engineering from MIT AND he was a great leader (his men trusted him with their lives because they knew he was the best man for their mission)…he knew his business better than anyone he led. He selected the pilots for the Tokyo raid, he selected the aircraft (B-25), he redesigned the fuel system to handle the extra fuel needed, and he flew the first aircraft off the carrier deck on the day of the mission. Why was Lt Col Doolittle selected to lead this mission? Because people will follow a credible leader whom they believe is the “BEST” leader to get them home alive…would Doolittle’s men have followed him if he had a reputation as a mediocre pilot or the best executive officer in the Air Corps?
