04 February 2015

The Highlander meets Munitions & Missile Maintenance Officers [Update Part I]

By Master Sergeant, Colonel (Ret) Dr. Larry Chandler

Like the book and television series, “The Highlander,” there should be “only one” generalist officer and we should address that officer as, “General.” When all our officers are generalist, the result will likely be the situation Admiral Kirtland Donald described to Secretary of Defense Gates in the 2008 report on the Taiwan nuclear weapons-related incident. See his remarks below. The bad news is that not much has changed. The USAF response to the Minot and Taiwan nuclear related incidents was to create three new major organizations, each organization with ~100 manpower positions. If the USAF stated one of the root causes of these two incidents to be, “The erosion of nuclear weapons expertise,” how is dividing the admittedly small number of nuclear weapons experts by 300 more positions requiring that nuclear weapons expertise a fix?

6.3. (U) The Declining Trend of Air Force Nuclear Expertise Has Not Been Effectively Addressed (U) There have been multiple reports over the last ten years that outlined the erosion of nuclear expertise in the Air Force. Most recently the February 2008 report of the Air Force Blue Ribbon Review of Nuclear Weapons Policies and Procedures stated that there "are some leaders with little, no, or dated nuclear experience who hold key positions in the USAF nuclear enterprise. including supervisors and enlisted members as well as squadron, group and wing commanders,"
6.3.1 (U) This investigation confirmed that the issues of nuclear experience and technical competency persist. Only half of the 22 commanders and vice commanders (0-6 and above) at the pertinent operational. engineering, and maintenance commands have a background in a missile-related field. Furthermore, the Investigation Team noted that some of these individuals in leadership positions lacked the technical and professional experience necessary to effectively analyze problems and develop sound solutions.
6.3.2 (U) This investigation identified several instances of a lack of wing, group and squadron leadership on the floor of the WSAs where build-up and disassembly of reentry systems occurs. The same observation was made during maintenance operations at the missile maintenance depot. As documented in this report the investigation Team identified many deficiencies in material control and work execution during tours of the WSAs and missile maintenance depot which should have been identified by the command's leadership.

Considering the situations described above by ADM Donald, some of us know the answer to the paramount question …”How could these incidents have occurred?” A: There can be only one generalist officer rank and these officers will be addressed as, “General.” If all the support officers are generalists, the “general” will have no expert captains - colonels to rely on to manage critical nuclear weapons maintenance and logistics organizations. The key to military success is developing the deep expertise of all the officers below the rank of general officer. For generalist to succeed they depend on organizations led and staffed by expert officers in each functional job specialty.

Sadly, now the USAF seems to have decided that all support officers (Officers who are not pilots) should be generalist, not experts. Nothing could be farther from the truth. If that delusional conclusion were true, NFL teams would be composed of all left guards and professional baseball teams would be comprised of all right fielders. Teams of generalist players would be easier to manage because any player could play any position and it is less expensive to pay for generalist than for expert specialist. It is amazing that no senior officer has yet seen how dumb it is to allow the Director of Personnel (A1) to drive the USAF to support a policy of developing generalist support officers. In part two of this article, I will provide specific examples and additional evidence to support my main argument: The USAF desperately needs expert officers to lead munitions and aircraft maintenance organizations (i.e., support officers).

19 January 2012

The Highlander meets Munitions & Missile Maintenance Officers

By Master Sergeant, Colonel (Ret) Dr. Larry Chandler

A long, long, long time ago in the U.S. Air Force, when munitions officers roamed the bomb dumps, weapons storage areas and EOD ranges, there were many of the world’s greatest pilots commanding munitions maintenance squadrons (MMS). AF policy at this time was based on the belief there were not enough flying squadron command billets for their elite officers (e.g., distinguished pilots) so some were assigned to command maintenance squadrons. I know this sounds strange today, but back then most of us were pretty convinced there were not going to be more than a handful of munitions officer colonels. The very best munitions officers sometimes were promoted to colonel and assigned as a major command director of munitions (LGW).  HQ Air Force and AFPC believed there was no real harm in using maintenance squadron commander assignments as developmental jobs for high-potential fighter pilots. Air Force senior leaders (i.e., also pilots) wanted to get as many of their promising aviators some experience leading and managing enlisted personnel. After all, many of these pilots were going to be promoted to colonel and a few might become general officer so they needed the command experience. Of course the career maintenance officers did grumble about this situation not being fair but that was normal, if you ran into a maintenance officer not grumbling about something you might want to call medical help? So grumbling and the unfair part aside, this system seemed to senior AF leadership to work and here is why. 

Fighter/bomber pilots know a lot more about munitions, missiles and weapons than most officers because it is their profession to employ munitions; if the munitions and weapons don’t work as designed they could die in combat. One of the best squadron commanders I ever worked for was an F-4E fighter pilot, Major Monte Crook at the 35th MMS. He did not know how to manage a MMS but he did know a lot about the munitions he employed in combat and he worked hard to learn all about our processes. He did not sit in his office getting briefings, he was everywhere, and on all three shifts…the bomb dump, the flightline, maintenance and inspection, he watched the AMMO trucks come into the storage area and learned the process of in-checking, inspection, accountability and storage according to compatibility group. He worked with the weapons loaders until he understood what it took to get a crew certified and keep them certified…he learned how load crews are managed to make sure all the aircraft scheduled get loaded at the right time. But the only reason Major Crook could survive as a generalist is that he had a cadre of expert munitions officers who knew their business inside out…they were not preparing for some future big job, they were already in it! In other words, the MMS commander was the only officer in the squadron that was in a competency-broadening assignment…every other officer was in a competency-using assignment.

In contrast, fast forward to today when all the officers might be on a career broadening assignment. There was an opportunity cost to the USAF in assigning Major Crook as the 35th MMS commander, but it was manageable then.  In August 2007, most of the officers in the Minot AFB WSA were inexperienced and all of the company grade officers were being rotated to work on the flightline for career broadening (e.g., quarterly). The result is that as Admiral Donald indicated in his investigation report on the Taiwan incident, “over half of the senior officers were not qualified to lead the organizations they commanded” (Donald, 2008, p. 47). If the squadron commander does not believe he or she needs to be sufficiently knowledgeable to manage the details of squadron operations, how will the other officers in the squadron see their role? Admiral Rickover, Father of the nuclear Navy, spoke to an audience at Columbia University in 1982 and said that if the boss does not believe the details are important neither will his staff…hence no one will be paying attention to the details (i.e., Minot-Barksdale incident).

We may have forgotten what a powerful motivator it is to “know you are really good at what you do, and how demotivating it is for officers to be continually assigned to jobs they have had no preparation for… compelling them to consider that they have little credibility with those they lead.  If there is only one officer in the squadron who is career broadening, the squadron might be able to perform without major failure, but we currently encourage all non-rated officers to career broaden.  Some officer resumes I have seen measure assignment length not in years but rather in months. So, how is career broadening working today?

After 20+ years of encouraging munitions officers not to get stuck in a single career field stovepipe, that maintenance officers should be logisticians not “just” munitions and missile maintenance officers, generalist logisticians (whoever they are and whatever they do?) are as thick as sand fleas. I would have said as thick as 13S officers but one must not exaggerate too much.  Now a MUNS can be staffed by junior officers in jobs they have never done before, working for a supervisor who has never done any of their jobs before, and working for a MUNS commander who is a missile and space operator (13S), aircraft maintenance officer (21A) with no prior munitions or nuclear weapons maintenance experience.  I guess in this scenario, the Air University ACSC or AWC advice to new commanders about relying on their “experts” and not trying to change things too quickly does not offer much help. Who is doing the mentoring?  One argument offered in defense is that all the technical expertise needed is resident in the NCO corps, but this begs the question, “how do the officers know” if operations are working effectively if few or none of them are knowledgeable in the munitions and weapons career fields?

Generalist (i.e., career broadeners) are OK, but only in small numbers and not in key leadership positions otherwise sports teams would be all “utility infielders” and the NFL teams would have “utility” defensive backs playing quarterback. While this seems to be common sense, the CSAF wanted maintenance officers to be “utility infielder officers” by merging AFSCs to get a broadened generalist officer…even after the Minot-Barksdale incident in 2007?  Is the concept you should understand the work of those you lead so difficult to understand?

OK, one last example and I will stop. If you are a general officer, let’s say the HQ AF A4L for example, and working on a very difficult and challenging problem, who do you want sitting around your staff table…5 colonels who are all alike (i.e., “logistics” colonels…jack of all trades but master of none) in that they have each done a little of this and a little of that functionally, plus some duties such as an executive officer, leadership fellowships, etc… while being developed for more senior jobs?  Or an alternate option… 5 of the most experienced, deeply expert colonels from their respective functional career fields (e.g., aircraft maintenance, munitions and missile maintenance, logistics readiness or even better, supply, transportation and plans)? 

Kotter (1982) found senior general and functional managers claimed to be generalist, but they were, in fact, deeply expert in their own company processes, products, services, industry and were deeply connected through a network of peers in the same industry.  These “general” managers rarely transitioned to new industries or businesses and there was a high failure rate for those few who did.  Similarly, MAJCOM and Air Staff functional colonels use to know everyone in their functional areas, there was a professional communications network that kept them informed and knowledgeable on the details of their specialties. When you have that depth of expertise and experience, you and your staff are working from strength not weakness. I know which scenario I would choose.

My theory is that “in the end, “there can be only one!” (Generalist) … and I recommend we address him or her as, “General.”   Since less than one percent of the officer corps will ever rise to general officer rank, we need to stop trying to develop every officer as if promotion to general officer is a realistic goal, and we need to focus instead on developing the 99% of officers so they will have the mission critical munitions and missiles and nuclear weapons maintenance management expertise and experience. Let’s choose organizational mission performance over careerism.

NOTE: Lt Col Jimmy Doolittle was not a generalist, he was an expert pilot, he had a PhD in aeronautical engineering from MIT AND he was a great leader (his men trusted him with their lives because they knew he was the best man for their mission)…he knew his business better than anyone he led. He selected the pilots for the Tokyo raid, he selected the aircraft (B-25), he redesigned the fuel system to handle the extra fuel needed, and he flew the first aircraft off the carrier deck on the day of the mission. Why was Lt Col Doolittle selected to lead this mission? Because people will follow a credible leader whom they believe is the “BEST” leader to get them home alive…would Doolittle’s men have followed him if he had a reputation as a mediocre pilot or the best executive officer in the Air Corps?

12 January 2012

Lieutenant, You Need to Get Out from Behind the Fence and Get to the Flightline if you Want to Get Promoted?

By Col (Ret) Dr. Larry Chandler & Lt Col (Ret) Brian Withrow

What is wrong with this advice given to many lieutenant 21M munitions and missile maintenance officers today (and really a long time ago, I got this advice myself)? The answer is, it depends. If you are the lieutenant, this advice is probably true in part, but for the U.S. Air Force, it is counter-productive personnel policy that degrades mission capability. Lets unpack the truth from the many myths. First what is, “behind the fence?”

The “fence” is the munitions storage area (MSA) or the nuclear weapons storage area (WSA), and for operational reasons both are not easy for the maintenance group commander or the wing commander (The Boss) to just stop by to see how the company grade officers (CGO) are doing. The MSA is usually far from the main base so an explosives accident won’t destroy the entire base. While the WSA is usually closer, there are all those security procedures; badge exchange, hand-carried items searched, vehicles searched, etc. The distance, security procedures, or both are very time consuming and inconvenient for the busy scheduled boss to just stop by…and so it happens infrequently.  The most likely time for visits is just before major inspections or when something goes wrong.  If you are the CGO in charge, is this the best of circumstances for getting to know the group and wing commander?

On a normal duty day behind the fence, there seems not much a flurry of activity, things look pretty calm, deliberate and scheduled in great detail.  On the flightline however, midst the routine hustle of getting the aircraft launched and recovered, the group and wing commander can easily stop by to see how things are going…and they do. There you are, a CGO hustling between aircraft, clipboard-schedule in hand, briefing what has just happened and what you expect is about to happen…the specialist and APG troops are working hard, aircraft engines running…excitement abounds.  Compare the two work situations and it is easy to see why those group and wing commanders suggest to 21M CGOs they “get out from behind the fence.”

But let’s look at this advice from an Air Force mission perspective. What if all the 21M’s take the advice and work hard to get out from behind the fence? Both officer and enlisted hear the constant hum of this advice and maybe think that means what goes on behind the fence is just not that important? Maybe after 20 years or so of this perception and advice being offered, the constant drumbeat to “career broaden”, and many officers taking it, we notice that maybe few officers are ever behind the fence for sustained or repeat tours of duty accruing, using and then passing along to those who follow….valuable experience and expertise? Shouldn’t Air Force leadership re-think this strategy and advice considering we are talking about munitions, high explosives that in an accident will cause many deaths and destroy operational mission capability…and nuclear weapons that in an accident scenario can result in National and international catastrophic consequences.  Munitions, that during contingency operations instantly become among the most coveted of resources for combat mission success.

There are many officers working on the flightline, several on group and wing staff, and several in each of the squadrons, but there are rarely more than 4-5 total in a munitions squadron including the squadron commander and operations officer. The level of responsibility for those very few CGOs “behind the fence” should give all of us pause. Without maturing a core of 21M officers with accumulated, “in-depth” munitions expertise, where will we get the staff officers to formulate policy, resolve logistics issues, and accurately advise senior leaders?  Has it been that long since August 2007 when the Minot-Barksdale incident forced the Secretary of the Air Force and the Air Force Chief of Staff to resign? 

I was very fortunate to work for DCMs (Group CCs for the newbies) and wing commanders who spent a great deal of time in the MSAs and WSAs where I worked. Gen (Ret) Earl O’Loughlin, MG (Ret) Lewis Curtis, Col (MG ret) Ed Bracken, Col (Gen Ret) John Gordon, Col (MG Ret) Sam Westbrook all spent so much time in the MSAs and WSAs, they could very accurately brief what we were doing (without a prepared PowerPoint presentation)…they grasped details and we knew they understood the details.

Most all munitions officers also served in aircraft maintenance jobs and did them well…that is because as young officers we learned by example that we had to know the details to survive. But most of us were vectored back into munitions positions with a “flightline” background to complement core munitions duties…not because this career track was great for us BUT because it was absolutely necessary for the Air Force.

I hope that NOT ALL our great 21M officers heed the constant drumbeat advice to get out from behind the fence, because the AF mission is too important to let careerism rule. Of the 21M officers who do get out from behind the fence, many are never allowed to return, or only return after far too many years away (e.g., Minot MUNS/CC in 2007 returned after 13 years in Special OPS).  Because the Air Force needs munitions and missile maintenance officers in there behind that fence managing munitions and nuclear weapons operations…safely generating combat power to accomplish the mission. When the shooting starts, commanders want to know where their AMMO is, (conventional munitions) and we always want to know where our nuclear weapons are! The 21M behind the fence is critical to USAF mission success, everyday!